One Foreign Policy or Two?

Finland’s New Constitution and European Policies of Tarja Halonen and Paavo Lipponen

Tuomas Forsberg

Finland’s new constitution that entered into force in March 2000 attempted to parliamentarise foreign policy decision-making and reduce the autonomous powers of the president. It divided foreign policy issues into two spheres: traditional foreign policy and European affairs, the former being the domain of the president and the latter that of the government. Moreover, even in the first sphere the president should act in co-operation with the government. Yet, there was no agreement among the political observers of how a potential clash between the prime minister and the president would be solved in practice. It was also evident that President Halonen and Prime Minister Lipponen, though both social democrats, held different views on foreign policy in general, and European integration in particular. This article looks into foreign policy decision-making under the new constitution and argues that although clear differences in opinion existed the president and the prime minister have been able to pull together when important issues have been at stake.

On March 1st 2000, two important events took place in Finland. Ms. Tarja Halonen started her term as the 11th President of the Republic of Finland. At the same time, Finland’s new constitution entered into force. Both changes indicated a shift in the Finnish foreign policy decision-making. Although the President remained the leader in the field of foreign policy and Halonen represented the social democrats likewise as her predecessor, the moment seemed to mark a beginning of a new era.

Finland has traditionally been a country where a strong consensus in the questions of foreign policy has prevailed. The post-war presidents were regarded as undisputed foreign policy leaders. Now, both structural and personal factors caused fears that major clashes might emerge. Firstly, the new constitution divided foreign policy issues into two spheres: traditional foreign policy and European affairs, the former being the domain of the president and the latter that of the government but it was deemed difficult to draw a clear boundary between them. Secondly, although Tarja Halonen had been a loyal foreign minister in Lipponen’s government and although both were social democrats, it was widely understood that their worldviews and political preferences were largely different. Halonen, as well as her successor as foreign minister, Erkki Tuomioja, represented more a “leftist Nordic social democracy” whereas Lipponen felt affinity with “rightist German social democracy”. In essence, the question

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was whether this new composition would change Finland’s European policy oriented towards “the core” that had been driven by Lipponen and the former president Ahtisaari.

The New Constitution

Finland’s old constitution of 1919 stipulated that “the relations of Finland with foreign powers shall be determined by the President”. Originally the presidential constitution was a compromise between bourgeois republicans and monarchists, and the President’s strong position reflected the idea that he or she would be able to define the national interest in a non-partisan way. Yet, the constitution was flexible when applied to practice and it allowed for a significant degree of variation. Although the paragraph on president’s power in the field of foreign policy gave a general mandate, foreign policy decision-making did not develop as president-centric before the Second World War. Of the post-war presidents, Urho Kekkonen in particular concentrated all power in foreign policy onto himself, so that the Government, including the foreign minister, unless he was Kekkonen’s trusted man, let alone the Parliament, were not able to influence foreign policy decision-making. Although Kekkonen’s foreign policy is still regarded as a success, and the lack of democracy as a necessity of the Cold War circumstances, the most deeply felt problem was that too much power in domestic politics was also allocated to the president.1

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The constitution aimed at tying the president to parliamentarily controlled decision-making. Although the president still remained the leader in the field of foreign policy, the new constitution reduced the autonomous powers of the president, and created a dualistic leadership structure for foreign policy: traditional bilateral foreign policy being the domain of the president, while European policy belongs to the prime minister. According to the constitution, “the foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government”. “The Government”, in turn, “is responsible for the national preparation of the decisions to be made in the European Union”.2

A trend towards parliamentarism had already appeared in practice. President Kekkonen’s successor Koivisto wanted to refrain from interfering in domestic political affairs in normal times and during Ahtisaari’s term as president, the centrality of the president was seen to be further in decline – Ahtisaari made his most impressive achievement as a mediator in the international arena during the Kosovo conflict and not as a figurehead of Finnish foreign policy. Instead, the
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The prime minister had risen as a more powerful figure than was the case during the Cold War. One reason why the prime minister gained more power was Finlan-d’s membership in the EU. As it was natural that Prime Minister represented Finland vis-à-vis his colleagues, then it was also necessary that he had a respective mandate to appear as a trustworthy partner. Yet, when the President still remained in charge of foreign and security policy, a dispute over Finland’s representation at European Council meetings emerged. Had the President abstained from the Council meetings, his power position would have been seriously eroded. The solution that was invented in 1994 was “a policy of two plates”, namely that both the president and the prime minister would attend the EU summit meetings if the president so wished.

The prime example of the development towards prime minister’s foreign policy leadership already under the old constitution was the decision to participate in the measures directed towards Austria in spring 2000. Prime Minister Lipponen made the decision on his own and President Ahtisaari accepted it only afterwards when he was informed about it. The decision was made when the old constitution was still in force and the action was not an EU matter, but coordinated bilateral policy of fourteen EU countries. The obvious constitutional contradiction led to public debate over the legality of Lipponen’s decision and even attempts to raise a lawsuit against him in the Parliament. The Chancellor of Justice examined the issue and held Lipponen’s conduct reprehensible because he did not negotiate with the President but not illegal as the President approved the policy afterwards.

It was not clear how much the new constitution would really change the role of the President. Certainly, the President did not become a mere representative figure, as some had wished, but could he or she still be an effective foreign policy leader? Key politicians, including President Ahtisaari, the later President Tarja Halonen as well as Prime Minister Lipponen, emphasised that the new constitution still gave the President the final say in matters of foreign policy. The Government had actually modified the wording of the draft into a looser direction so that president did not need to direct foreign policy “together” but only “in co-operation” with the government. Ahtisaari was of the opinion that “actually very little was changed”. In one way, the constitution was seen as a codification of the changes that had already taken place in practice. Some other politicians who had been drafting the constitution in the parliament as well as political and legal experts wanted to see a more significant change taking place. In view of Professor Teija Tiilikainen, for example, the role of the president as an independent decision-maker had come to an end. Professor Antero Jyränki contended before Halonen had started her term that under the new constitution the president’s role is to do with supervision and slowing down rather than leading, but observed towards the end of the year that Halonen had taken a more powerful role than that. Professor Esko Antola anticipated that Finland would have two different kinds of foreign policies. The president’s foreign policy would be based more on contacts with the great powers and personal diplomacy. The prime minister’s foreign policy, in turn, would focus on institutions and European integration. Yet, it was also remarked that a constitution will always be formed in practice by the personalities who occupy the positions. The first term was seen of a particular importance because it would set the precedence.

One obvious problem with the constitution was that there was no exact definition of where traditional foreign policy stops and where EU policy starts. In principle, almost all issues can potentially be counted as EU affairs. Yet, traditional foreign policy issues were regularly handled at the European summits. The practice of the “policy of two plates” remained as before. President Halonen an-
nounced that she intended to represent Finland in the European Council, as her predecessor had, whenever she liked to do so, but in the Government’s view she needed the Government’s approval for her participation. In any case, the new constitution revindicated the operational hierarchy. At the Nice European Council the division of labour was such that Prime Minister Lipponen was responsible for leading the negotiations but Halonen participated in the discussion whenever foreign and security policy issues were on the agenda. Yet, Halonen did not draw a sharp line between traditional foreign policy and EU affairs. In her speech at the Parliament Halonen contended that the co-operation between the highest state organs had functioned well. She also hoped that the highest possible degree of concord in the decision-making concerning EU affairs would prevail. In other words, she indicated that the President should still be a relevant actor in Finland’s European policy.

Prime Minister’s growing role also implied that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs could not claim the authority in the EU affairs. In the spring of 2000, this question about the division of labour between the ministries was on the agenda when the leaders of Finnish delegations to the Intergovernmental Conference and enlargement negotiations were nominated. The result was that Minister for Foreign Affairs led the former delegation and Minister for European Affairs the latter. A strong symbolic change that had also important practical repercussions was that the EU secretariat that coordinates Finland’s EU policy was moved from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister’s office.

Paradoxically, at the same time that Tarja Halonen’s potential election to president was being criticised during the campaign on the grounds that the social democrats would continue to have a “straight flush” in foreign policy, after her election there were fears that a potential clash between the president and the prime minister would emerge. Columnist of the daily *Helsingin Sanomat*, Olli Kivinen saw in May some signs of the existence of two different foreign policy lines in particular with the NATO issue. Jussi Seppälä of the YLE broadcasting company, in turn, argued that there would be two conflicting approaches towards Finland’s participation in the European defence integration at the Biarritz meeting. In both cases, the contestants themselves denied that any major disagreements existed. Indeed, everything seemed to be smooth. Yet, if one compares the statements of the Prime Minister on the one hand with the President and the Foreign Minister on the other, clear differences are easy to observe.

Although Halonen had served as foreign minister in Lipponen’s government, it was widely understood that their political worldviews and practical emphases were different. Lipponen had been a firm EU enthusiast for a longer period of time, whereas Halonen had stressed the role of the Council of Europe. These views had clashed, for example, when the government decided on the preparation of the EU charter of basic rights, as Halonen saw such a charter as undermining the work of the Council of Europe. As in many similar situations, it was Halonen who budged, and Lipponen whose policy line prevailed.

A shift in attitude was expected in particular in Finland’s stance towards NATO, as both Halonen and Tuomioja were seen as representing a pacifist tradition in comparison to Lipponen and Ahtisaari. Lipponen had defended the option line in the question of Finland’s membership in NATO against those who stressed non-alignment as a more or less permanent condition. For him, Finland’s political latitude would be scaled down, if it said that it would never join NATO. Lipponen’s second government also no longer referred to
“independent” defence as a basis of Finland’s security, but spoke only of ‘credible’ defence. Tarja Halonen’s speeches raised, however, suspicions about a change in the Government’s policy. In her inauguration speech to the parliament, she said that a need to prepare for membership of NATO was not an aspect of a jointly approved position. Halonen also brought back the concept of ‘independent’ when characterising Finnish defence.

The differences between Lipponen’s and Tuomioja’s thinking can be traced back to the arguments that were used in the EMU debate. Prime Minister Lipponen’s view was based on the continuing relevance of geopolitics and historical experiences. He is constantly aware of Finland’s position as a neighbour of Russia and recalls that Finland was left alone by the West to deal with the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Thus, according to him, when the EU and Europe change, Finland is still in danger of remaining the object of bilateralism, the object of Moscow’s and Berlin’s policy. Lipponen thus concludes that Finland has to get as deep as possible into to the inner circle of the Union where the future of the EU is decided. This was Lipponen’s argument for joining the EMU.

Tuomioja, in turn, criticised Finland’s EMU decision. He disputed the usefulness of Lipponen’s historical analogy of Finland being left alone. Tuomioja finds the likelihood of the renewal of Tilsit (1809) or Ribbentrop Treaty (1939) type situations so small that the historical experience of being left alone cannot be used ‘in the current world’ as a reason for neglecting important economic and social interests that were at stake as Finland decided to join the EMU. By the same token, Tuomioja does not believe that historical experiences should lead Finland to seek today any particular relationship with the EU. Instead he has stressed the aim of strengthening European cooperation and mutual interdependence.

Tuomioja has explained that he was in favour of Finland joining the European Union, in particular because he saw the EU as a means to manage globalisation democratically. For him, security reasons were not dominant.

These basic differences in the European policy were observed many times during the year 2000. In line with his argumentation in the EMU issue, Lipponen emphasised that Finland should belong to the avant-garde group in all domains of European integration in order to be able to influence EU’s future development. This logic would give a compelling argument for Finland’s participation in strengthened defence cooperation within the EU. Halonen, in turn, does not think that Finland should necessarily aim at belonging to the “military core” of the EU. In her view, “there is no need for Finland to be in every core, but only in those that benefit Finland.” When she spoke in Stockholm in May 2000 outlining Finland’s security policy, she also made it clear that she did not “see a need to add a mutual defence obligation to the EU’s functions.”

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Lipponen and Halonen also gave divergent assessments of the pace of enlargement of the EU when they visited Estonia in May 2000. Lipponen contended that according to the prevalent view, Estonia is on the top of the candidates when the EU picks up new members.26 Only one week later, Halonen advised Estonians to be patient about the membership negotiations. In Halonen’s view, no one should promise any privileges to the candidate countries, such as being among the first ones to join.27

A further example of the existence of two approaches to European integration within the Government – as well as the Social Democratic Party – was given by the reactions of Tuomioja and Lipponen to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s speech in May. Tuomioja rejected Fischer’s proposal out of hand and argued that his ideas lay too far away on the horizon. Tuomioja also considered it as contradicting the principle of equality in the Union. He did not feel that it is right to push through decisions and models that would bind the future decision-makers to “what we, as a Leninist elite, have seen to be right”.28 Lipponen in turn regarded Fischer’s address as praiseworthy independently of whether one subscribes to his thesis. In view of Lipponen, Fischer’s ideas were radical, but a constructive reply cannot be “no-no-and-once-again-no”. Yet, Lipponen criticised Fischer for naming countries of the core group beforehand. In Lipponen’s view it is a sign of a narrow view of Europe. If core countries are qualified on the political basis of their geographical location, the Union would lose its credibility.29

Lipponen himself presented his approach to European integration in his speech in Bruges in November 2000. The speech was a classical defense of a communitarian approach to European integration against intergovernmental trends. In Lipponen’s view, the community method has brought enormous benefits through the single market and the EMU. The commission should continue to play the key role of an initiator and guardian of treaties in the future. For Lipponen, the intergovernmental method is often inefficient, lacks transparency and leads to the domination of some over others. Lipponen also said he was in favour of Tony Blair’s aim to develop the EU into a superpower in international relations but regretted that in recent months the developments in the Council had led to a decreasing role of the Commission in external relations.30

Lipponen wanted to take part in the debate concerning the finalité of the Union with a concrete plan. Indeed, he was the first leading Finnish politician who proposed a constitution for the EU. In his proposal, without stating it explicitly, Lipponen paved the way for a bicameral institutional structure. The Council would operate on the basis of the equality of member states. The Parliament, in turn, would represent democratic legitimacy. The Commission should enjoy the confidence of the Parliament, and its President should have powers to appoint members of the Commission. Lipponen stressed that any moves towards a European constitution need to be solidly supported by the public and suggested that the preparation should occur on a broad basis. The best model would be a Convention that should include the governments and national parliaments of the member states and the candidate states and the EU institutions and representatives.

Tuomioja’s speech that he held a few days later in Paris was tuned very differently. Tuomioja first explained the virtues of the Nordic welfare state tradition and reminded that the integration process in Europe was from the Nordic point of view not considered to be sufficiently open, indeed it is closed to the rest of the world and even protectionist. In Tuomioja’s view, the efforts to deepen integration can be considered to constitute a threat to the Nordic welfare model. According to Tuomioja, the Nordic approach to member-
ship of the EU is essentially characterised by pragmatism and evolution. The fragile equilibrium between intergovernmental and communitarian thinking as well as between the small and big countries should be maintained also in the future.  

As to the debate concerning the finalité of the Union, Tuomioja stressed that there is no established programme for how to proceed. He emphasised that in the majority of European countries, the citizens are not ready for a European federation. Actually, Tuomioja wanted to halt the debate: “Although it is interesting and important to exchange opinions about what we would like Europe and the Union to look like after 20 to 40 years, it is necessary to accept the fact that, at the moment, we cannot make decisions that would be binding on future decision-makers nor do we have the right in principle to do so.” In Tuomioja’s opinion, there is “something very disgusting and deeply undemocratic in the way of thinking according to which we must, now at the latest”, before the new member states have been accepted to the Union, “construct an everlasting vision of future Europe.”

Furthermore, Tuomioja criticised those who wanted to see the European Union become a superpower. He found it hard to discover anything positive in such endeavours, because there should be no room nor need for manners that have been traditionally adopted by superpowers in the first place. Tuomioja was also wary of Finland’s participation in the any further form of strengthened cooperation and reminded the audience that other countries should not depend on the assumption that Finland and the Finns would be always prepared to accept any pursuits related to the deepening of integration.

Lipponen’s speech in Bruges can also be contrasted with Halonen’s remark just before the Nice European Council on the need to think about the possibility of exiting a core group within the European Union. She would like to know, how one is able to take steps backward as well as forward. Halonen contended that the European Union is not “a bicycle” that needs constant pedalling in order not to stop leading to the rider falling off. She said she is not planning to ride a bike all the time but a better metaphor for her is a home where one can live and act.

Yet, the Nice European Council summit showed that despite of their different approaches to European integration the leaders were capable of effective cooperation when real issues were at stake. Despite their alleged disagreements, the social democratic troika formed by the president, the prime minister and the foreign minister were able to pull together. After the meeting President Halonen gave credit to Lipponen for his efforts at the summit. Obviously, one reason for this smoothness was that Finland was not put into a difficult situation by the items on the summit agenda. The Parliament was also tied to the negotiations closer than in any other EU country. The Prime Minister had presented the position of the government in the parliament and the negotiators were also in contact with the chairman of the Grand Committee during the summit.

The Finnish Government was largely dissatisfied with the spirit and uneasy about the results of Nice European Council, although it was content with Finland’s own lot. Lipponen was reported to have said during the meeting that European ambition was below zero level and afterwards he threatened not to accept the treaty. In Tuomioja’s view the summit took the easy way out and decisions concerning the share of the votes in the Council and the seats in the European Parliament were groundless and illogical. The President noted in her New Year’s speech that problems and challenges of cooperation have been deliberated quite openly. For all three, the important point of satisfaction was nevertheless that the conference succeeded in its basic objective, namely that the European Union was ready to admit new members.
Conclusions

Since Finland entered the EU, it had systematically tried to get “into the core” of the Union. Prime Minister Lipponen was often seen as the personification of this policy. He was supported by President Ahtisaari, and he did not seem to have any significant challengers in the government, while the opposition remained weak. During the year 2000 a discussion about the endurance of this foreign policy doctrine emerged. The new President Halonen and Foreign Minister Tuomioja seemed to represent a swing towards the left and Lipponen’s position within his own party was seen as weakening. Ironically, Lipponen was more popular among the conservatives than among his own party members.

Criticism of Lipponen was to some extent but not chiefly connected with his European policy. It seemed that most people did not approve the federalist-sounding ideas of the Bruges speech and Lipponen was seen as furthering more the interest of the EU than that of Finland. Halonen’s foreign policy, in turn, received a good grade from the people. In this sense, one could conclude that Lipponen’s policy on European integration rests on the constitutional mandate, but Halonen’s line has more political support.

The new constitution’s dualistic structure in foreign policy decision-making hence enables that both the Prime Minister and the President could create a foreign policy profile of their own. During the first year of Halonen’s term as President, she and Lipponen were also able to find a modus vivendi regarding their roles. Both were able to use effectively those powers that the constitution guaranteed to them. Although the different views on a number of issues ranging from security policy to integration policy expressed by Lipponen on the one hand, and Halonen and Tuomioja on the other, caused some confusion, the disagreements did not develop into an acute crisis. In fact, one could say that the debate demonstrates that Finnish foreign policy decision-making was no longer as sensitive and confidential as it used to be during the Cold War. Moreover, despite their obvious differences in opinion, one should not lose from sight that the common standpoints were considerable: in the social democratic troika all support the development of crisis management capabilities of the EU but not that of the EU’s common defence, as well as intensive cooperation with NATO but not Finland’s membership of NATO, and their views on Finland’s and the EU’s relations with Russia were congruent. The Nice summit also showed that when real issues were at stake, the Finnish foreign policy decision-makers were able to rely on national consensus that has been characteristic of post-war Finnish foreign policy.

Notes


Tarja Halonen, address to the Parliament, 1 March 2000.

Tarja Halonen, speech at the promotion ceremony of cadet officers, 4 June 2000.


Paavo Lipponen, speech at the College of Europe, Bruges, 10 November 2000.

Erkki Tuomioja, Address at the French Institute for International Affairs, 15 November 2000.


