By
Mikko Mattila & Petri Uusikylä
Department of Political Science
P.O.BOX 54
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
E-mail:
mmattila@valt.helsinki.fi
uusikyla@valt.helsinki.fi
Abstract
This article analyses cutbacks in Finnish social and health care programmes. Eight hypotheses were formulated and then tested with empirical cutback data from 1991-95. The analyses showed that strictly administrative programmes and those focused on marginal groups were more likely to be cut more than other programs. These results partially endorse to the 'vote-maximising politician' and the 'blame-avoidance' hypotheses. Political decision-makers try to distribute the cuts so that the negative impact on the vast majority of voters is minimised. In addition to this, it seems to be easier for politicians to pass the blame for unpleasant cuts to others. The empirical analyses did not corroborate the 'bureaucratic politics' theory according to which bureaucrats are in such an important position in the budgetary process that they can protect themselves from cuts. The analyses showed that the administration was hit by cuts significantly harder than other programs. Neither was the impact of powerfull interest groups significant in the analysis.