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REMARKS ON GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS
AND SECOND ORDER LOGICS

Our first remark makes explicit a simple folklore characterization for the logics which are definable by a set of generalized quantifiers.

We shall restrict ourselves to finitary generalized quantifiers in the sense of Lindström [2]. Our abstract logics and systems of abstract logics are defined as in Barwise [1], and moreover closed under operations of $L_{\omega \omega}$.

Suppose we have a system of abstract logics L^* which in some sense is generated by a set of formation rules. Then the logic is usually closed under substitution in the sense that atomic formulae in a given formula can be substituted semantically. Also it is clear that the logic should become finitary in the sense that each formula depends only on a finite nonlogical language (signature). In fact, these two properties are sufficient to give the logic a kind of a set of formation rules, in the semantical sense.

1.

The following two conditions are equivalent for any system of logics L^* :

- (i) There are generalized quantifiers Q_i , $i \in I$, s.t. ($\forall i \in I$)
 $L^* = L(Q_i)$, $i \in I$,
- (ii) L^* is finitary and satisfies substitution,

Proof

It suffices to look at the implication from (ii) to (i). Let us take a language L_0 which contains a countably infinite amount of n-ary relation symbols for any arity n (we are omitting function and constant symbols throughout).

Assuming

$$I_\alpha^* = \{\varphi_i \mid i \in I\}$$

Let

$$Q_i = \text{Mod}(\varphi_i), \quad i \in I.$$

Each Q_i can be considered as consisting of structures over a fixed finite signature, namely over the signature φ_i , on which it essentially depends. Necessarily each Q_i is closed under isomorphism. The relation $L(Q_i)_{i \in I} \leq L^*$ is now proved by induction, using the substitution property. For the converse, assume $\varphi \in L^*$ and φ depends only on $L_1 \subseteq L$. Suppose f is an arity-preserving injection of L_1 into L and φ_f is the result of replacing R by fR in φ for $R \in L_1$. Then φ_f is some φ_i and hence, assuming $L_1 = \{R_j \mid j \leq n\}$,

$$\models \varphi \leftrightarrow Q_i x_0, \dots, x_n : R_0(x_0), \dots, R_n(x_n).$$

In the following L^{II} denotes the usual second order logic with set variables ranging over unary predicates.

L^{III} differs from L^{II} in having set variables over unary predicates of power $< \omega$. An immediate application of 1 is

2.

There are $Q_i, i < \omega$, s.t. (for any L) $L^{II} = L(Q_i)_{i < \omega}$.
 There are $Q_i, i < \omega$, s.t. (for any L) $L^{III}_\alpha = L(Q_i)_{i < \omega}$.

In the following we answer the question whether the quantifiers Q_i above can be chosen among the monadic ones.

3.

There are no monadic $Q_i, i < \omega$, s.t. $L^{III}_\alpha \leq L(Q_i)_{i < \omega}$.
Proof

Let us assume that $Q_i, i < \omega$ are monadic quantifiers. The proof is restricted to the case; each Q_i is of type $\langle 1 \rangle$, but it readily generalizes to type $\langle 1, \dots, 1 \rangle$ quantifiers.

In the following $L = \{R\}$, where R is binary, and K is a class of L -structures s.t. K is closed under isomorphism and if $\langle A, E \rangle \in K$ then E is an equivalence relation on A with at least two equivalence classes each being of the power of A . We shall write $\models_K \varphi$ for $\forall \alpha \in K : \alpha \models \varphi$.
 For $i < \omega$ let

$Q_1(n)$ be $\exists x_1, \dots, x_n (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} x_i \neq x_j)$

$Q_1(\bar{n})$ be $\exists x_1, \dots, x_n (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} x_i \neq x_j \wedge Q_1 x_i < x_j)$

$Q_1(I)$ be $\exists y Q_1 x R(x, y)$

e_n be $\exists x_1, \dots, x_n (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} \neg R(x_i, x_j))$.

$B = \{ \phi \in L(Q_1) \mid \bigwedge_{i \leq n} \vdash_K \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \text{ for some Boolean combination } \psi \text{ of formulae } x = y, R(x, y), Q_1(n), Q_1(\bar{n}), Q_1(I) \text{ and } e_n \}$.

$IF_x = \{ \phi \in B \mid \text{for all } i \leq n : Q_1 x \phi \in B \}$.

We shall aim at showing $IF_x = IB$. At first we easily see that

3.1 F_x contains atomic formulae and all formulae without x free.

3.2 If $\phi \in F_x$ and x not free in A , then $\phi \vee A \in F_x$.

3.3 If ϕ, ψ and $\phi \vee \psi$ are in F_x and x is not free in A , then $(A \& \phi) \vee \psi$ is in F_x .

3.4 If $\phi_1(x, y), \dots, \phi_n(x, y) \in F_x$ and $\bigvee_K \bigvee_{i \leq n} \exists x \phi_i(x, y)$,

then $\bigvee_{i \leq n} \phi_i \in F_x$. Here $\bigvee_{i \leq n}^1$ means "there is exactly one $i \leq n$ s.t."

Let U, V and W be sets of variables. We write

$Max(U, V, \phi(x'))$ for $\bigwedge_{u \in U} (x' / u) \wedge \bigwedge_{U \subseteq W \subseteq V} \bigvee_{w \in W} \neg \phi(x' / w)$

$E_x(U, V, W)$ for $\bigwedge_{v \in V} x \neq v \wedge (\bigvee_{u \in U} R(x, u) \vee \bigvee_{w \in W} x = w)$

$N_x(U, V)$ for $\bigwedge_{u \in U} \neg R(x, u) \wedge \bigwedge_{v \in V} x \neq v$.

A direct calculation shows that

3.5. If the finite U, V, W, S and T do not contain x , then $E_x(U, V, W)$, $N_x(U, V)$ and $E_x(U, V, W) \vee N_x(T, S)$ are in F_x .

Furthermore we notice that

3.6. $\bigwedge_K x = y \vee E_x(U, V, W) \vdash \bigvee_{V_0 \in V} Max(V_0, V, x = y) \wedge E_x(U, V - V_0, W \cup \{y\})$

3.7. $\vdash (R(x, y) \wedge \bigwedge_{v \in V_0} x \neq v) \vee E_x(U, V, W) \iff$

$\bigvee_{V_1 \subseteq V} \bigvee_{V_2 \subseteq V_0} Max(V_1, V, R(x', y)) \wedge$

$Max(V_2, V_0, R(x', y)) \wedge E_x(U \cup \{y\}, (V - V_1) \cup (V_2, W))$.

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$$\begin{aligned} 3.8. \quad & \vdash_{\mathcal{K}} E_x(U_1, V_1) \wedge N_x(U_2, V_2) \wedge U \subseteq U_1, \quad V \subseteq V_1 \\ & \text{Max}(U, U_1, u \in U_2, R(x', u)) \wedge \text{Max}(V, V_1, v \in V_2, (x' = v) \wedge \\ & N_x(U, V)). \end{aligned}$$

Now we are ready to prove.

$$3.9. \quad F_x = B.$$

For let $\phi \in IB$. Then $\vdash_{\mathcal{K}} \phi \leftrightarrow \psi_1 \vee \dots \vee \psi_n$, where each ψ_i is a conjunction of the generators of IB . By 3.2 and 3.3 we may assume each conjunct of each ψ_i contains x free. Using well known properties of identity and equivalence relation we may finally reduce all conjunctions to one of the following forms: $x \sim y, R(x, y) \wedge \bigwedge_{u \in U} x \neq u, u \wedge \bigwedge_{u \in U} R(x, u) \wedge \bigwedge_{v \in V} x \neq v$. All these are of the form of an $E_x(U, V, W)$ or a $N_x(U, V)$. By 3.6 - 3.8 ϕ can be built from formulae of the form $E_x(U, V, W)$, $N_x(U, V)$ or $E_x(U, V, W) \vee N_x(T, S)$, which all are in F_x using the restricted Boolean operations under which F_x is closed by 3.2 - 3.4. So finally ϕ is in F_x .

A direct consequence of 3.9 is

$$3.10. \quad L(Q_1)_{1<\omega} = B.$$

Using 3.10 we can easily prove

3.11. For any ϕ in $L(Q_1)_{1<\omega}$ there is an $n < \omega$ s.t. is $\alpha \models e_n$ & ϕ for some $\alpha \in K$, then $\mathcal{L} \models e_n \rightarrow \phi$ for any $\mathcal{L} \in K$ s.t. $|Z| = |\alpha|$.

Proof of 3.

Let ϕ be the following L^{II}_{α} - sentence :

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall xR(x, x) \wedge \forall xy(R(x, y) \rightarrow R(y, x)) \wedge \forall xyz(R(x, y) \wedge R(y, z) \rightarrow R(x, z)) \wedge \\ & \neg \exists X \forall x \exists y(X(y) \wedge R(x, y)). \end{aligned}$$

Suppose ϕ is equivalent to an $L(Q_1)_{1<\omega}$ -formula, and 3.11 gives the natural number n to this formula. Let E be an equivalence relation on \mathcal{S}_α with \aleph_α many equivalence classes each of the power \aleph_α , and E' an equivalence relation on \mathcal{S}_α like E but with n classes. Now $\langle \mathcal{S}_\alpha, E' \rangle \models \phi$. Hence, by 3.11 $\langle \mathcal{S}, E' \rangle \models \phi$, a contradiction.

We have studied logics with an infinite number of generalized quantifiers. In the following we shall study the extent to which 2 holds for finite L .

A signature consisting of n -ary relation symbols only is called below n -ary.

also a Q.s.t. in L^{III} .

of course.

Proof

Let R_j^1 be 1-ary, $\Phi_0 = \{R_j^1 \mid 0 \leq j < n, j < \omega\}$ and $(L_0)^{III} = L^{III} - \{R_j^1 \mid j < \omega\}$.
for $k < \omega$ let $t_k < \omega$ s.t.

$$\Phi_k = \Phi_{k-1} \cup \{R_j^{t_k} \mid 0 \leq j < n, j < t_k\}.$$

Let $\Psi_k(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be the result of replacing $R_{j,1}^{1,1}(u_1, \dots, u_{n,1})$ in Φ_k by $B(x_1, u_1, \dots, u_{n,1}, u_{1,1}, \dots, u_{1,t_k})$, where B is a new $(n+1)$ -ary predicate. Let Q be the type $\langle 2, n+1 \rangle$ quantifier consisting of these structures $\langle M, A, B \rangle$ which satisfy the following sentence for some $m, k < \omega$ s.t. $t_k = m$:

$$\exists x_1, \dots, x_n (\forall x (\exists y A(x, y) \rightarrow \bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq m} x_i = x) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq m} \exists ! \exists^k z A(x_i, x) \wedge \Psi_k(x_1, \dots, x_n)),$$

where $\exists !^k$ is the quantifier "there exists exactly k x s.t."
It remains to prove $L^{III} \leq LQ$. So assume we are given an n -ary language L and $\Phi \in L^{III}$. Then there are $m, k < \omega$, $m = t_k$, and R_1, \dots, R_m n -ary s.t. Φ is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned} \exists x_1^1 \dots x_k^1 \dots x_1^m \dots x_k^m (\wedge \{x_i^1 \neq x_j^1 \mid i < m, j < k, l < j\} \wedge \forall x y, \exists i, \dots, \\ \forall \{x = x_i^1 \wedge y = x_j^1 \mid i < m, j < k\}, (\vee \{t = x_1^1 \wedge R_1(u_1, \dots, u_{n,1}) \wedge \dots \} \wedge \dots)) \end{aligned}$$

It is obvious that the Q above is not definable in L^{III} . In fact we have

5.

There are Q_1, \dots, Q_n s.t. for all binary L , $L^{III} = LQ_1 \dots Q_n$. The same applies to $L_{(\omega)}^+$ (with finite L) and to any L_α , $\alpha > 0$.

Proof

The claim concerning $L_{(\omega)}^+$ follows from theorem 5 of Lindström.
For L^{III} it suffices to notice that the formula

$$\Phi(x) \leftrightarrow \text{def } \exists X "X is an } LQ_1 \dots Q_n \text{-sentence, } X \text{ is a satisfaction relation for } LQ_1 \dots Q_n \text{ and the empty sequence satisfies } X"$$

can be arranged to define the true L_{α}^{II} -sentences in a suitable expansion of \mathfrak{S} . Now assuming $\mathcal{Q}_{\alpha} \varphi \in L_{\alpha}^{II}$, $\varphi(\mathbf{x})$ is L_{α}^{II} -definable. But, by an underinability of truth argument, not $L_{\alpha}^{I} \dots L_{\alpha}^{n}$ -definable. Our final remark shows that \mathfrak{S} fails for monadic L . The quantifier \mathcal{Q}_{α} says "there exists at least \aleph_0 many x sat."

6.

For monadic L , $L_{\alpha}^{II} = L_{\alpha}^I$ (and $L_{\alpha}^{II} = L_{\omega\omega}$, of course).

Proof.

We call atomic formulae and their negations basic. We have identity, of course. It can be proved that every L_{α}^I -formula is equivalent to a formula of the following type, which we call reduced formulae,

$$\exists x_1 \dots x_n \bigvee_{i \leq i_0} \bigtriangleup_{j \leq j_0} \varphi_{ij},$$

where each φ_{ij} is of the form

$$Q_x(A_1(x) \vee \dots \vee A_n(x))$$

or of the form

$$Q_x x(A_1(x) \& \dots \& A_n(x))$$

with A_1, \dots, A_n basic and Q being \vee or \check{Q}_{α} , the dual of Q_{α} . Now we prove that L_{α}^{II} -formula is equivalent to a reduced formula. By the above it suffices to show that $\exists x \varphi$ has this property whenever φ does. So assume φ is equivalent to a reduced formula. As $\exists x$ commutes with $\exists x_i$ and disjunction, it suffices to reduce the formulae $\exists x \varphi_i$, where φ_i is $\bigvee_{j \leq j_0} \varphi_{ij}$ as above. After eliminating some trivial cases, φ_i can be written in the form

$$\forall x((X(x) \vee A(x) \& (\neg X(x) \vee B(x))) \& Q_{\alpha} x(X(x) \vee C(x)) \& Q_{\alpha} x(\neg X(x) \& D_1(x)) \& \dots \& Q_{\alpha} x(\neg X(x) \& D_m(x)),$$

where A, B, C, D_1, \dots, D_m are conjunctions or disjunctions of basic formulae not containing X . A direct calculation shows now that $\exists x \varphi_i$ is equivalent to

$$\forall x(A(x) \vee B(x) \& \check{Q}_{\alpha} x C(x) \& \check{Q}_{\alpha} x A(x) \& Q_{\alpha} x(A(x) \& D_1(x)) \& \dots \& Q_{\alpha} x(A(x) \& D_m(x)).$$

By the above this can be brought to a reduced form. So we have proved that $L_{\alpha}^{II} \leq L_{\alpha}^I$. The converse inclusion is trivial.

References

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