by Raimo Tuomela
CHAPTER 1. Introducing Social Action and Cooperation
I What is Cooperation? 1II Introducing the Basic Elements of Cooperation 4
III Theses on Cooperation 11
IV Survey of the Contents of the Book 17
Appendix 1: Previous Research on Cooperation 20
Appendix 2: Collective Social Action and Cooperation 23
CHAPTER 2. Collective and Joint Goals 26
I A Classification of Collective Goals 26II The Components of Collective Goals 30
III The Basic Analysis of Intended Collective Goals 33
IV The Collectivity Condition for Goals 40
V The We-attitude Analysis of Collective Goals 49
VI Collective and Private Attitudes 53
VII Joint Intentions and Joint Goals 57
VIII Summary 68
CHAPTER 3. Cooperative Joint Action 72
I Acting Together 72II Cooperative Joint Action 79
III Given and Final Preferences 88
IV Cooperative Joint Action more Precisely Analyzed 93
V Conclusion 102
Appendix: Bratman's Theory of Cooperation 103
CHAPTER 4. Cooperation and Collective Goals 108
I Cooperation as Involving a Collective Goal 108II Detailed Analyses of Cooperative Situations 115
III Cooperation, Common Goals, and Social Dependence 126
IV Partial Cooperation 132
V Cooperation in the Individual Mode 136
VI Conclusion 137
Appendix: Coordination and Collective Goals 138
CHAPTER 5. Cooperation, Practical Reasoning, and Communication 141
I Cooperation and Practical Reasoning 141II Collective Goals and Communicative Action 152
III Communicative Intentions 156
IV Summary 164
CHAPTER 6. Cooperation in Institutional Context 165
I Collective Acceptance and Cooperation 165II Social Norms and Social Institutions 171
III Institutional Cooperation 177
IV Concluding Remarks 189
Appendix: Social Norms 190
CHAPTER 7. Cooperation and Cooperative Game Theory 195
I Cooperative Game Theory 195II Collective Goal Theory and Cooperative Game Theory 202
III Agreement and Commitment 205
IV Summary 211
CHAPTER 8. The Components of Social Control and Dependence 212
I Introduction 212II The Components of Social Control 213
III Measurement of the Components of Social Control 219
IV Correspondence and Concordance of Preferences 224
V Control Related to Social Action 227
VI Concluding Remarks 229
Appendix: Comments on the General Case 229
CHAPTER 9. Cooperation and Preferences 232
I Introduction 232II The Degree of Correlation of Preferences 233
III Examples of Interaction Structures 237
IV Cooperation and Correlated Preferences: The Key Arguments 240
V Summary of the Preference and Goal Correlation Account 249
CHAPTER 10. Cooperation and the Dilemma of Collective Action 256
I Introduction 256II An Analysis of Free Riding 264
III Examples of Collective Action Dilemma Structures 268
IV Coordination and Conflict in Selection Situations 275
V From Given to Final Utilities 279
VI Conclusion 289
Appendix A. Three-Person Games with a Collective Action Problem 290
Appendix B. Case Studies of Collective Action Structures and the Components of Social Control 293
CHAPTER 11. Rational Cooperation and Collective Reasons 298
I Rational Cooperative Action and Acting for a Collective Reason 298II The Desirability of Cooperation 305
III The Rationality of Cooperation 306
IV I-mode Utilities and We-mode Utilities 313
V The Centipede, Trust, And Rationality 318
VI Conclusion 333
Appendix 1: Joint Equilibria 335
Appendix 2: Rational Intentions and Strategic Interaction 338
CHAPTER 12. Long-Term Cooperation 341
I Repeated Situations of Strategic Interaction 341II Different Kinds of Solutions to Collective Action Dilemmas 346
III Experimental Results on Cooperation 351
IV Evolutionary Game Theory, Similarity, and Cooperation 356
V Concluding Remarks 366
CHAPTER 13. Conclusion 368
I The Basic Ideas and Theses 368II The Main Results 374
III Relevance to Moral and Political Philosophy 377
Notes 380
References 415
Index of Names 422
Subject Index 424