Two traditions of interaction research

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The paper compares Bales' Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) with Sacks' Conversation Analysis (CA), arguing that CA has answered several questions that originally motivated the development of IPA, and while doing so, it has re-specified the phenomena of interaction research. These two research traditions are in many ways diametrically opposed: the former is quantitative, theory-oriented and aims at global characterizations of interactional situations, while the latter is qualitative, inductive and aims at characterizing specific layers of organization (such as turn taking or sequence organization) that give structure to interactional situations. Their primary objects of study are different. For the Balesian tradition, it is the functioning and the structure of a small group, whereas in the Sacksian tradition, it is the structures and practices of human social interaction per se. It is argued, however, that CA has radically expanded understanding of the questions IPA was originally developed to address. These questions include allocation of resources, control and solidarity. Bales' research deals with them in terms of the differentiation of participants of a group, whereas CA has re-specified them as emergent aspects of the very rules and structures that constitute and regulate interaction sequences. The uniqueness of the CA perspective on social interaction is demonstrated by exploring the display of emotion as an interactional phenomenon. It is argued that the display of emotion is intrinsically embedded in the sequential organization of action. Sensitive ‘coding and counting’ approaches can detect emotion displays, but the contribution of CA is to show the specific ways in which they are part of the business of interaction.

In one of his earliest lectures on conversation, in 1964, Harvey Sacks pointed out the virtual lack of direct observational studies on human behaviour in the social sciences. There were, however, some recent exceptions which Sacks briefly commented upon:

Bales has the notion that you can categorize [human behaviour] as it comes out, so that you sit and watch people as they are talking, and write down categories of what they are doing as they’re doing it. That makes it into some kind of trick. There’s no reason to suppose that you should be able to see it right then and there. (Sacks, 1992a, p. 28)

Sacks then went on to describe his own incipient method, contrasting it with Bales’ approach:

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Instead, you take these little pieces and you try to collect those that look alike, and it can take an awfully long time to understand any given one.¹ (Sacks, 1992a)

Rather than categorizing interactional events with a ready made classification, Sacks’ incipient method started from the meticulous examination of single cases, progressing towards the discovery of structures that organize social interaction. This seems to be the only recorded comment that Sacks ever made on Bales’ work. And, as far as I know, Bales has not referred to Sacks. However, both of them created powerful traditions of research on social interaction which formed the shape of much social psychological research during the second half of the 20th century.

In this paper, I explicitly compare and contrast the two traditions of interaction research. The main focus in this paper is on the Sacksian tradition, but Bales’ work will be used to set the topics for comparison. In the first part of the paper I argue that beneath the obvious differences, there is common ground between the two traditions. I attempt to describe the Sacksian tradition, and its most influential line, Conversation Analysis (CA), in the light of some central concerns of Bales’ work, arguing that Sacks (and CA especially) has expanded our understanding of many questions that Bales’ research was initially geared to tackle. In the second part of the paper, the uniqueness of the CA perspective on social interaction will be demonstrated by exploring the display of emotion as an interactional phenomenon. It is argued that the display of emotion is intrinsically embedded in the sequential organization of action. Sensitive ‘coding and counting’ approaches can detect emotion displays, but the contribution of CA is to show the specific ways in which they are part of the business of interaction.

Differences and common ground between the two traditions

The Balesian tradition
This somewhat older tradition originated in the early work of Robert F. Bales. It uses quantitative analysis to examine human interaction. Interaction process is seen as an interplay of acts which in Bales’ original method (Interaction Process Analysis, or IPA) are described by a theoretically grounded category system (Bales, 1950). This category system consists of twelve distinct acts, such as ‘agrees’, ‘shows tension’, ‘gives opinion’, and ‘asks for suggestion’. The categories are classified in several overlapping ways; one classification divides them into those that belong to the ‘socio-emotional area’ (including, among others, ‘showing solidarity’ and ‘agreement’) and those that belong to the ‘task area’ (including, among others, ‘giving opinion’ and ‘asking for suggestion’).

In IPA, the researcher’s task is to find out how frequently actions belonging to each category occur in the encounter that is being examined. By examining how frequently acts fitting different categories take place during different phases of the encounter, in different positions in relation to each other, and how the acts belonging to different categories are distributed among the participants, the researcher aims to describe the distinct character of the group: the phases of its activity, and the differentiation in the roles of its members (see Bales, 1953; Bales & Slater, 1956).

Even though Bales’ IPA is nowadays mainly of historical interest, its influence is felt in most social psychological interaction research which categorizes behaviour and counts it. For example, in research on doctor–patient interactions, Bales’ original method was

¹I thank David Silverman for drawing my attention to this extract in Sacks’ lectures.
actively used up until the 1980s (e.g. Brownbridge et al., 1986; Carter, Inui, Kukul, & Haigh, 1982; Davis, 1971; Korsch, Gozzi, & Francis, 1968; Stewart, 1983, 1984), and several newer research methodologies are in great debt to Bales. In general social psychology, one contemporary example of approaches building upon Bales’ findings – although not a direct continuation of Bales’ work – is Expectation States Theory (see Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). That IPA continuously serves as a model for observing and understanding social behaviour is also evident in textbooks: for example, the methods section of the influential *European introduction to social psychology* (Manstead & Semin, 2001) discusses only three observational methods: participant observation, non-participant observation and Bales’ IPA.

Originally, the method was developed for examining problem solving discussion groups set up for research purposes in a laboratory setting; but it can be and has been used in research on various different types of face-to-face encounters, including naturally occurring ones (cf. Bales, 1953; Eskola, 1961). After his trail-blazing studies in the 1940s and 1950s, Bales further developed his method and theory by integrating in it the analysis of values (Bales & Couch, 1969) and resulting in the new method of ‘Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups’ (Bales, 1999; Bales & Cohen, 1977).

IPA has been criticized for failing to produce explicit and intersubjective accounts of the coding process (Mishler, 1984, pp. 37–41), for failing to deal with the multiple dimensions of action, especially actions that have both ‘task’ and ‘socio-emotional’ components contained within them (Wasserman & Inui 1983), and for lack of sensitivity to the character of specific interaction environments, such as medical consultations (Byrne & Long, 1976, p. 30; Mishler, 1984, p.41; Wasserman & Inui, 1985). New quantitative methods for the study of social interaction have been developed in partial response to these criticisms. These include Thomas, Bull, and Roger’s (1982) Conversational Exchange Analysis, Roter’s (1991) Interaction Analysis (which is adapted to one specific environment, medical consultation) and Stiles’ (1992) Verbal Response Mode Analysis (which involves an effort to deal with some multiple dimensions of action). The category systems in these approaches vary, but in all of them, social interaction is treated as a process that unfolds in and through distinct acts that can be divided into a limited set of categories (cf. Bull & Roger, 1988). In this paper, I focus on Bales’ IPA, the original, most influential and still best known approach, even though many of my arguments will apply to the other ‘coding and counting’ approaches as well.

**The Sacksian tradition**

About 15 years later than Robert Bales, Harvey Sacks and his colleagues started to pursue a quite different kind of interaction research (Sacks 1992a, 1992b; Schegloff, 1992b; Silverman, 1998). Research in the Sacksian tradition is most often called Conversation analysis (CA; for a contextualization of CA within social psychology, see Maynard and Whalen [1995] and Maynard and Peräkylä [2003]); Sacks’ work has also offered crucial insights for discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two traditions concerns the primary object of study. In the Balesian tradition, it is the small group, its functioning and its structure, which is the main focus. IPA is a tool for gaining insight into matters such as differentiation of roles or leadership in small groups. In the Sacksian tradition, the primary objects of study are the structures and practices of human social interaction *per se* - not interaction as a carrier of other social phenomena (see Heritage, 1995; Kendon, 1987; Schegloff, 1992b; Zimmerman & Boden, 1991).
There are many other differences as well. Research done in the Sacksian tradition is qualitative, whereas in the Balesian tradition it is quantitative. Bales studied primarily group discussions organized for research purposes, while Sacks insisted on the exclusive use of naturally occurring data. The action categories used in IPA were largely derived from (Parsonian) social theory, whereas research in CA proceeds on an inductive basis (Clayman & Maynard, 1995), starting from the examination of single sequences of interaction. Balesian research aims at rather global descriptions of the interactional events being studied, whereas in the Sacksian tradition, the researcher focuses on discrete aspects of the organization of the interaction (such as turn taking, sequence organization, repair or choice of words) and their intersections, without trying to give a global description of the interactions in which they occur. And finally, through focusing on the frequencies of distinct types of actions, the Balesian tradition presupposes that the meanings of actions inhere in those actions themselves: a single act is to be characterized as ‘giving opinion’, ‘asking for suggestion’ or the like. Only in the event of classification dilemmas, does the context (what happened just before and immediately after the act that is being considered) become prominent and relevant (Bales, 1950, pp. 90–92). In CA, however, research focuses on the reflexive construction of the meaning of actions: what a single act is gets defined by the interacting partners in and through the larger sequence of acts that a single action is part of (Heritage, 1984a).

My own intellectual home is in the Sacksian tradition. In this paper, however, I wish to examine the kinds of challenges Bales’ work poses for CA and show how CA might respond to these, as part of the broader project of developing and adequate social psychology of social interaction.

**Bales’ questions to Sacks**

A central theoretical concern of Bales, associated with the development of the IPA method, involved the formulation of the *main dimensions of the relationship between the participants* of any group. In his 1950 book, Bales (p. 73) identified four such dimensions; they all involve the differentiation of the participants. First, there is differentiation in access to resources; second, differentiation in control over other persons; third, differentiation in status in terms of importance or prestige; and fourth, differentiation in solidarity. The 1950 scheme was not followed up in this form in Bales’ later work, but it served as the backdrop for the development of his later studies on differentiation in leadership functions (for example, Bales & Slater, 1956).

According to Bales, differentiation between participants can change momentarily, but it tends to become institutionalized, thereby establishing the social structure of the group. Here, I deal with three out of the four dimensions Bales picked up: access to resources, control and solidarity. The position of the fourth dimension (differentiation in status) is somewhat ambivalent: in empirical terms, Bales saw it as a product of the three other dimensions rather than as independent (Bales, 1950, pp. 167–168). Bales maintained that all dimensions of differentiation could be measured using the 12-item category system. He proposed concrete mathematical formulae to describe the degree of differentiation in a group and the positions of each member in these dimensions (Bales, 1950, pp. 165–172).

In the following, I attempt to interrogate the Sacksian tradition, using Bales’ terms. I will show how CA deals with questions pertaining to allocation of resources, control and solidarity. These questions are neither the starting point nor the manifest focus of the CA studies but, in its own inductive way, the CA has developed answers to them.
Even more importantly, I will argue that CA entails a re-specification of phenomena and research questions pertaining to allocation of resources, control and solidarity, and this re-specification opens up avenues of understanding that cannot be reached using a ‘coding and counting’ approach such as IPA.

The ways in which CA deals with these questions is very different. Bales’ experiments with small groups made observable the process whereby the participants’ original expectations (their ‘frame of reference’) concerning the differentiation between them became realized and institutionalized (Bales, 1950, pp. 72–73). The experiments involved an attempt to understand the *genesis*, or the original development, of the differentiation (see Bales, 1950, pp. 153–154; Bales, 1999, p. 159; Bales & Slater 1956). The Sacksian tradition, in contrast, examines social structures in naturally occurring environments. Normally, it does not aim at understanding the evolution of these structures, instead, it seeks to describe in detail their functioning. Instead of examining actions as an expression of the differentiation of the participants, CA studies examine the structure of the very actions. For CA, ‘structure’ is primarily a property of action sequences (such as questions and answers, or announcement and receipt; see Heritage & Atkinson, 1984), and in the analysis, the relations between persons are seen as derivative of such structures of actions (see e.g. Maynard, 1991).

**Access to resources**

In spite of these fundamental differences in approach, Bales’ research questions can help us to understand the potential of the Sacksian tradition. One dimension of the relationship between the participants of a group, according to Bales, was access to resources (Bales, 1950, pp. 74–75). Bales pointed out that members of a group often do not have equal access to some of the resources (e.g. goods or skills) that are necessary for attaining goals. If unpredictable, the distribution of resources may create tensions. Hence, there is a pressure towards the stabilization of rights and duties with regard to this distribution.

The Sacksian tradition has dealt with both cognitive and material resources; in what follows, I focus on the former. Cognitive resources – in terms of expert skills and knowledge – were indeed central also for Bales (see Bales, 1950, p. 81). Several conversation analytical studies have explored the ways in which the possession of knowledge, and the authority arising from it, are produced by interaction, and, in their turn, shape it, both in ordinary conversation (Goodwin, 1984, 1986, 1987; Schegloff, 1992a) and in institutional environments (e.g. Drew, 1991; Maynard, 1991).

Let us consider some recent studies in the field of doctor–patient interactions. Christian Heath (1992) has demonstrated the asymmetry of medical consultations, by showing how in Britain, patients in GP consultations frequently remain passive (either by staying silent or by producing minimal responses) after having heard the diagnosis by the doctor. Heath regards this silence as indicative of the patient’s orientation to the doctor’s authority in the field of diagnostic reasoning: the doctor has privileged access to resources of diagnostic reasoning. Following Heath’s study, researchers have explored other aspects of the distribution of the resources of medical reasoning in consultations. Peräkylä (1998) demonstrated how the doctors in Finnish primary health care systematically, either verbally or through the placement of their diagnostic utterances, make available for the patients some of the grounds of their diagnostic conclusions. In making these available for the patient, the doctors treat themselves accountable for their diagnostic reasoning – and thereby, they do not claim that they
possess exclusive access to the resources of diagnostic reasoning. Moreover, the doctors’ choices concerning the ways in which they make the grounds of the diagnosis available for the patients are not without consequences: in those cases when the doctors *verbally explicate* the grounds of their diagnostic conclusions, the patients start to talk about the diagnosis relatively often (Peräkylä, 2002, and forthcoming). Yet another aspect of patients’ access to cognitive resources has been explored by Gill (1998) and Raevaara (1996, 2000), who have examined the patients’ explanatory proposals delivered during the consultation: these frequently given proposals demonstrate that the patients, too, have legitimate access to resources of medical reasoning, although these resources are different from those of the physician.

These studies yield an emergent picture of the local production of the doctor’s authority, counterbalanced by the doctor’s accountability and the patient’s demonstrable access to some aspects of medical reasoning. It appears, therefore, that within CA, it is possible to observe the distribution of resources in the details of social interaction. In comparison to the Balesian approach, CA involves a re-specification of questions concerning the distribution of resources. CA studies do not aim at giving an *in toto* characterization of the participants’ relations in terms of their access to resources (cf. Bales, 1950, pp. 167–168). Instead, they focus on specific sequences (such as the delivery and reception of patients’ explanatory proposals, or the delivery and reception of doctors’ diagnostic conclusions). And, through the examination of these, they gradually uncover the ways in which cognitive resources are distributed and redistributed in specific moments of interaction. The discovery of these sequences, and the understanding of their implications for the allocation of cognitive resources, was only possible through naturalistic, inductive and qualitative research. In a similar fashion, the studies by Goodwin (1994, 1995) and Heath and Luff (2000) offer accounts of the practices through which access to artifacts and tools is regulated in technological working environments. In the future, it would be possible to study the participants’ ways of dealing with their differentiated access to other material resources, for example by studying sequences where questions about medical insurance, sick leave or fees for service are discussed.

**Control**

For Bales, control over other persons was another basic dimension to the differentiation of the participants of a group. Because persons *can* control one another, and because control of another person’s action is often necessary for the attainment of individual and collective goals, there is an inherent need in any group for institutionalization of control in terms of rights and duties (Bales, 1950, pp. 75–76). There is an intriguing paradox in the Sacksian tradition’s relation to issues of control. On one hand, there are very few, if any, explicit discussions about control in the central CA texts. If, indeed, control is understood as a unilateral process where the controlled party has no choice but to obey, then it is something that cannot be found in the spoken interaction investigated by CA.\(^2\) However, if reciprocity is allowed in the notion of control, then many CA findings are very relevant. CA studies show how parties to any interaction constrain the actions of one another, and how the constrained parties construct their subsequent responses in terms of alignment, misalignment or resistance. Or, in more technical terms, CA studies have examined different

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\(^2\) Acts of physical or mental violence, discussed by Billig (1998) perhaps come closest to unilateral control. Even in these acts, however, as long as the victims are alive, they probably make interactional choices.
realizations of \textit{sequential implicativeness} (Schegloff \& Sacks, 1973) between turns: how a question (Schegloff \& Sacks, 1973), assessment (Pomerantz, 1984), story preface (Sacks, 1974) or any other accountably produced action shapes the field of possibilities on which the next speaker inevitably will operate (Heritage \& Atkinson, 1984). CA studies also highlight the reciprocity of control by showing, for example, how answerers can resist the presuppositions of the questions (Peräkylä, 1995, ch. 7) or how the recipients can ‘heckle’ the production of a story (Sacks, 1974).

Therefore, CA has developed, off record as it were, pivotal means for the study of the ‘microphysics’ of control in social interaction, understood as a reciprocal process. And again, as compared with the Balesian approach, CA has re-specified the research questions. For conversation analysts, the primary site of control is neither in persons nor in their relations, but in actions and sequences of actions. Whatever shape the patterns of control between persons or within groups take, these patterns rest upon the sequences of action that CA aims at describing.

Taking one more example from doctor–patient interaction, Ruusuvuori (2000) has recently examined the ways in which primary care patients tell doctors the reason for their visit. Often, instead of delivering a plain answer to the doctor’s opening question, the patients embark upon a narrative, starting from the appearance of the first symptoms, for example, and only gradually approaching the here and now situation. By using this narrative format, the patient invites the doctor to adopt the position of a recipient until the narrative reaches the present moment. The doctors usually align as recipients, thus on their part facilitating the narrative. However, here also the control relation is reciprocal – as indeed in the production and reception of any turns at talk (Sacks, Schegloff \& Jefferson, 1974) and narratives (Sacks 1974; Schegloff, 1992a). First, by beginning a story-formatted problem delivery the patients make it relevant for the doctors to adopt the recipient position, and hence, doctors also can accountably decline that position. In more specific terms, Ruusuvuori (2001) has shown, for example, how the doctors’ gaze operates as a means for control during the patients’ stories. Gaze withdrawal in key moments of the stories result in observable perturbations in the progression of the narrative (see Goodwin, 1984).

To summarize, the Sacksian tradition has developed pivotal means for the examination of control in social interaction. It has re-specified questions about control by showing how control in interaction is rooted in sequences of action and how it is co-produced by all parties involved. Again, by starting from the case-by-case analysis of actual instances of interaction, CA has gained access to the details of the operation of sequences where control is exercised and resisted.

\textbf{Solidarity}

For Bales (1950; pp. 78–80), the third basic dimension of social relations within a group involves solidarity. Bales regarded \textit{socio-emotional} acts as the carriers of solidarity (1950, pp. 168–169). ‘Shows solidarity’, ‘shows tension release’ and ‘agrees’ are the \textit{positive} acts in the socio-emotional area, whereas ‘disagrees’, ‘shows tension’ and ‘shows antagonism’ are the \textit{negative} acts.

As with resources and control, the Sacksian tradition investigates solidarity through the examination of specific types of sequences. Agreements and disagreements, which for Bales were central vehicles of solidarity, have also been examined by conversation analysts. Anita Pomerantz (1984; see also Heritage, 1984a; Schegloff, 1995) showed, for example, how the organization of social interaction gives \textit{preferred} status to agreements (as opposed to disagreements), as well as to, for example, positive responses to
requests (as opposed to rejections) and – on another level of organization – offers of help (as opposed to requests for it). The preferred status of these acts (‘preference organization’) is manifest in the manner of their production: they are produced straight away, without delay and hesitation, as unmarked (Levinson, 1983). Their counterparts (disagreements, rejections of requests, and so on) are, in contrast, produced as marked: they are typically delayed and accompanied by hesitations, mitigation and accounts.

As Heritage (1984a; see also Pomerantz, 1984) points out, these CA findings throw light on the structural basis of solidarity in social interaction. As a result of preference organization, acts that maintain solidarity in a straightforward way are systematically distinguished from those acts that are problematic in terms of solidarity. And moreover, through their unmarked production, the former types of acts are treated as the ‘default’ option. Thus, again, the Sacksian tradition ends up dealing with the same issues that Bales was also interested in, re-specifying the questions and phenomena of research. For CA, the heart of solidarity resides in the organization of action, not in relations between persons per se. This re-specification has made it possible to give a more sensitive account of solidarity. For example, conversation analysts have shown how ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’ components are often mingled: disagreements are often preceded by agreement components, and acts that show agreement in a downgraded way can engender sequences where disagreement becomes apparent (Pomerantz, 1984). In such cases, to code actions simply as ‘agreements’ or ‘disagreements’ does not do sufficient justice to the actuality of the phenomenon.

From distributional phenomena to structures of action
Access to resources, control and solidarity were the three central theoretical themes motivating and permeating Bales’ interaction process analysis. According to Bales (1950, p. 30), these and related themes have ‘gone into the construction’ of the IPA categories. The IPA category system made it possible to study these themes as distributional phenomena: as results of the accumulative choices of action by the participants in small groups.

CA, as noted, did not originate from these kinds of theoretical considerations. Instead, it was started by Sacks and his co-workers as a new form of naturalistic inquiry into the practices and structures of interaction as phenomena in their own right. However, I have demonstrated how research in CA has yielded results covering the very themes that Bales suggested IPA was developed to deal with. There is much more in common between these traditions than is usually thought (see e.g. Psathas, 1994). But, as compared to the Balesian approach, CA has also re-specified the phenomena and research questions of interaction analysis. The central focus of all CA studies is on the organization of sequences of actions. Therefore, CA studies have elucidated ‘access to resources’, ‘control’ and ‘solidarity’ not as distributional phenomena pertaining to the differentiation of the members of a group, but as emergent aspects of the very rules and structures that constitute and regulate interaction sequences.

It would be premature to suggest, however, that ‘coding and counting’ is always the less fruitful choice for a method in interaction research. There are research questions – for example, pertaining to process-outcome correlations in clinical interactions (e.g. Leuzinger-Bohleber & Target, 2002; Wasserman & Inui, 1983) – that it is not possible to answer without quantitative measures of the interaction process. In dealing with them, even a crude measure is better than no measure. Moreover, it needs to be borne in mind that the coding and counting of interactional events can and does occur using
categories that arise from CA (Boyd, 1998; Heritage & Greatbatch 1986; Heritage & Roth, 1995; West, 1984). The quantitative applications of CA are much narrower and of more specific scope than the Bales’ system. They concern specific interactional practices found in specific settings and they arise from careful case-by-case analysis of those practices. A recent example involves Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) effort to measure the degree of adversarialness of journalists’ questions in US presidential press conferences. A coding scheme, like Bales’ IPA, which would be universally applicable, is not conceivable in CA terms, at least not at the moment.

**Emotion as an emergent theme in conversation analysis**

My aim in the second half of the paper is to provide an empirical demonstration of the CA approach, using an example that concerns one of the core themes of social psychology: the display of emotion. Display of emotions was a central theme for Bales. In CA, emotion as such has not often been discussed or taken as the topic of research. However, a number of CA studies deal with phenomena that are relevant for the understanding of emotions. Moreover, in another important branch of the Sacksian tradition, discursive psychology, emotion has been explicitly topicalized (Edwards, 1997, 1999, Edwards & Potter 1992). Through formulating some aspects of a CA approach on emotions, my intention is to further elaborate the contribution CA can make to the social psychology of social interaction.

**Display of emotions**

It was pointed out earlier that in investigating preference organization, conversation analysts have in fact analysed phenomena that are closely related to what Bales called ‘solidarity’. The concept of preference does not, however, cover all the acts that Bales treated as vehicles of solidarity. Some of the remaining ‘solidarity relevant’ acts involve *displays of emotion*: laughter, joy and demonstrations of love and attraction; fear, anxiety and anger also belong to the ‘socio-emotional area’ (Bales, 1950, pp. 177–181, 188–195). The Balesian tradition has been described as particularly successful in dealing with emotional aspects of interaction (Wasserman & Inui, 1984). Using Bales’ original approach, researchers have found, for example, that the proportion of acts involving negative affect in doctor–patient interactions correlate negatively with patient satisfaction and compliance (Freemon, Negrete, Davis, & Korsch, 1971).

Among the approaches that have taken their inspiration from Sacks, discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter 1992) has paid the most explicit attention to emotions. Discursive psychology has focused on the ways in which emotions are lexically described, avowed and ascribed in talk and in written texts (see Edwards, 1997, 1999; Edwards and Potter, 1992), seeking to show how emotion terms and descriptions are used ‘in assigning causes and motives of action, in blamings, excuses, and accounts’ (Edwards, 1997, p. 170). Emotional states, described in text or talk, ‘may figure as things to be accounted for...as accounts...and also as evidence of what kind of events or actions precede or follow them’ (1997, p. 170). Thus, in discursive psychology, emotion descriptions are seen as an essential resource in accounting of and accounting for action.

Rather than focusing on the use of emotion terms and descriptions as a resource for accounts, conversation analysts have focused on more immediate lexical and non-lexical expressions of emotion. Some studies have examined the organization of actions that in themselves can be regarded as displays of emotion. Thus, Jefferson
(e.g. 1984, 1985a) and Haakana (1999, 2001) have studied laughter, Heath has studied embarrassment (1988) and expression of pain (1989), and Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) have studied ‘hysteric’ displays of anxiety in emergency calls. These studies analyse sequences of actions that displays of emotion engender or are part of. Thus Haakana (1999, 2001), for example, demonstrated how the patient’s unilateral laughter in Finnish general practice consultations often occurs in sequences where the patient needs to correct too positive a view of him/herself, suggested by the doctor. For example, when the doctor enquires about the amount of exercise the patient gets, her/his candidate understanding may be too high and the patient needs to correct it. Such corrections are regularly accompanied by the patient’s laughter. Haakana argues this laughter is a conventionalized way of dealing with the delicacy and the negative moral implications of the corrections.

In a number of other CA studies, the main focus has been on more complex activities where the display of emotion forms a part. These include recounting of troubles (Jefferson, 1980, 1988; Jefferson & Lee, 1992), accounting (Buttny, 1993, ch. 6), and delivery and reception of good and bad news (Freese & Maynard, 1998; Maynard, 1997, 2003). Jefferson (1980, 1988), for example, shows how in a troubles-telling sequence in ordinary conversation, emotional reciprocity is regularly built up step by step: in the progression from exposition of the trouble by the troubles-teller, via the affiliation shown by the troubles-recipient, to an affiliation response in which the troubles-teller is observably ‘letting go’. In what Jefferson and Lee (1992) call service encounters (occurring in institutional environments), however, this emotional reciprocity is normally missing, as the recipients regularly do not offer (and the people with troubles do not seek) affiliation, and the sequence unfolds differently.

On the basis of these existing studies, it is possible to begin to specify the contribution CA can make to the understanding of emotions. Sequentiality is the underlying motif in the Sacksian tradition. Anything that is done in social interaction is done with reference to the preceding acts and to the anticipated following acts. Actions do not have meaning in themselves, but they become meaningful through their place in the self-organizing continuum of actions. The studies cited above show that displays of emotion are no exception to this. Therefore, in CA, displays of emotion are seen and examined as parts of larger sequences of action (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998, p. 158; cf. Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996). To show how CA accomplishes this, I now analyse two brief sequences of interaction, to further show the basic logic of the approach.

**Emotion in announcement sequences**

Announcements are one type of sequence where displays of emotion frequently take place (Maynard, 2003). Schegloff (1995) points out that there are two sorts of interactional issues posed in announcement sequences, both cropping up especially in the second pair of parts following the announcements. One involves the registration whether ‘what has been told is in fact “news”’, and the other involves ‘stance toward the news’ (p.31). It is in responses displaying stance that the emotional component often comes into play.

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3In this context, theoretical discussion about the ‘nature’ of emotion and affect (e.g., questions about the ‘biological’ vs. ‘cognitive’ theories of emotion) will be neither possible nor needed. I will use the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ interchangeably, and my interest focuses exclusively on those aspects of emotion/affect that the interactants make publicly available (through verbal and non-verbal means) for others to observe.
I analyse two announcement sequences. In one of these the recipient displays strong emotion (astonishment and alarm), while in the other the recipient remains relatively unemotional. The analysis seeks to show how the sequences are differently built up, thereby providing for the different emotional tones. In Extract 1, a young man (‘Jussi’) has just phoned his aunt. At an early point in the call, the Aunt tells Jussi that her sister (‘Maila’) has just been admitted to hospital. It is in line 11 where the recipient displays his astonishment and alarm.4

Extract 1: Beginning of a telephone call

The Aunt answers the phone; this answer is not recorded.

1 Jussi: This is Jussi. I hope I didn’t wake you up,

2 Aunt: No,

3 Aunt: hh I was sleeping so deep.

4 Jussi: Oh gosh.

5 I’m sorry you see it’s already twenty past nine,

6 (1.0)

7 Aunt: Really,

8 Jussi: It is h.

9 Aunt: hhh ( ) I was so exhausted, hh listen ( ) Maila

10 is now hh in Louhela hospital,

11 Jussi: Reallyh,

12 Aunt: hh Yes hh you know yesterday it got so wild.

13 (1.0)

14 Jussi: Oh dear,

In line 9, the Aunt gives an explanation (account) for being asleep when the phone rang. She expands the initial account (exhaustion) by reporting a state of affairs that explains her exhaustion. Maila (her sister; very close to her, and also known by the caller) is now in hospital (lines 9–10). The report is designed as an announcement, rather than merely as an additional part of the account, through the inclusion of the attention getting marker ‘listen’ (line 11) preceding the report and treating it as an act on its own right, and through the use of the temporal marker ‘now’ (line 12) which suggests that the reported status of Maila is new.

In response to the announcement, Jussi says in line 11 ‘Really, h’ (Finnish ‘Iha tottah’, literally translated ‘Quite true’). His utterance is hearable as astonished and alarmed, conveying something like ‘I didn’t expect that and I am worried for her’. What is it about the utterance that makes it hearable this way? At least two aspects are indicative. First, there is the choice of words and the syntactic structure of the utterance. Through the lexical choices, this response does more than, for example, ‘oh I see’ would do (see Extract 2, line 8), as ‘oh I see’ would only propose that the reported state of affairs is new information for the recipient. In this sequential position, Jussi’s response is a question, which conveys ‘ritual disbelief’ in the news. It is an utterance type conventionalized in the (Finnish) language for expressing epistemic uncertainty and affect. It proposes that the reported situation is somehow difficult to come to terms with.5 Second, the prosodic features are equally important. There is stress on the

4The extract is translated from Finnish; the Finnish original and a word-by-word translation are available from the author.
5Note how Jussi uses almost the same words as the Aunt was using in line 7, in response to Jussi telling her that it is already twenty past nine. (In the original Finnish transcript, there is a slight difference: Aunt says ‘Ihaks totta’, while Jussi says ‘Iha totta’. Aunt’s turn is explicitly marked as a question with the question marker -ks.) Also the Aunt’s words convey that the reported situation – in this case the time being so late while she was still sleeping – is difficult to come to terms with. The prosody of Jussi’s ‘really’ is, however, different.
first syllable of the utterance (marked with an underlining) and the pitch at the
beginning of the utterance is higher than the pitch in Jussi’s talk in the earlier parts of
the call (marked with an upward pointing arrow). The smileyness that there was in
Jussi’s voice at the beginning of the call has disappeared in line 11, giving way to a
somewhat breathy voice quality. (For CA research on prosody, see Couper-Kuhlen &
Selting 1996, Schegloff, 1998.)

Jussi’s response also prompts the Aunt to give further details about the reported and
responded to state of affairs (Maila being in hospital). In line 12, she first reconfirms
the news (in response to the ‘questioning’ component of Jussi’s initial response in line
11) and then gives a brief description of Maila’s condition on the day she was admitted
to hospital. The key word of the description – Finnish ‘hurjaa’, for which there is no
exact equivalent in translation but which approximates ‘wild’ – maintains an affective
orientation towards the events being described; the intensifier ‘so’ intensifies the
affect. As often in news delivery sequences (Maynard, 1997, 2003 cf. Sacks, 1992b,
pp. 572–573), after the elaboration, the recipient (Jussi) produces an assessment. The
pitch level of his voice goes down. Through this pitch change and the word selection,
the assessment maintains the emotional orientation by conveying sympathy (line 14).

Thus, in Extract 1, it appears that the recipient’s first response to the news has a
strong emotional component, conveyed by prosody and lexical choice (for lexical
choice and prosody in announcement responses, see Freese & Maynard [1998], and for
the connections of prosody with stance and mood, see Schegloff [1998]). The ensuing
elaboration of the news and assessment maintains an affective orientation.

We may contrast the previous example with the following one in which announce-
ment is also given as an account. However the announcement here is responded to
with a minimal display of affect by the recipient; the key parts of the response are in
lines 8 and 11.

**Extract 2: Beginning of a telephone call**

1 Liisa: °Liisa Kuittinen°,
2 Tuula: =.hh It’s Tuula Ranin here hello,:,
3 Liisa: (Hi. ) – – – – – –
4 Tuula: [.hhh)#I: Well erm # I haven’t contacted you for
5 ages as I haven’t [really had time]=We’re here going
6 Liisa: [(↑ Alright) ]
7 Tuula: through l- changes in ↑life.=
8 Liisa: ↑ Oh [ ↓ I see.
9 Tuula: [hhh W(h)e a(h)re like m- m- moving: to
10 ↓ Valtimo. .hhh[hhhhhhhhhhh] hhh And li[ke m]
11 Liisa: [Gosh:. ] [“() ]even°
12 Tuula: #m t-erm-eh-eh# in this situation now then like:
13 fh fh erm of course the economy will get even tighter than
14 what it used to be so like .hh[hh ]erm eh I thought
15 Liisa: [oo Yeah:.oo]
16 Tuula: that(m- eh) I would collect something from the Kotitukku=,
17 Liisa: =Yes: s that’s quite all right.
18 Tuula: [.hhh ↑ But like ] mhhh .mt on the
19 Other hand hand…
(Continues with a proposal for the arrangements.)
After the exchange of greetings, Tuula, the caller, presents an apology for not having been in touch with Liisa (lines 4–5). The apology – which is accepted by Liisa in overlap (line 6) – engenders a telling sequence which unfolds in a ‘step-by-step’ manner (cf. Schegloff, 1995, p. 39). Immediately after the completion of the apology, Tuula ‘rushes through’ to an announcement of ‘changes in life’ (lines 5–7). The announcement is, through its location, hearable as an account or explanation for the recent failure to keep in touch. The word selection ‘changes in life’ (line 7) leaves it unspecified what kinds of changes have happened to Tuula and those close to her, while it does indicate that the changes are major ones, *life* changes. Liisa responds with ‘oh I see’ (Finnish ‘ai jaa’; line 8) which orient to Tuula’s prior talk as an announcement (rather than an account) and treat it as news for her (cf. Jefferson, 1981; Heritage, 1984b). As a news receipt, Liisa’s response also makes it relevant for Tuula to unpack what the life changes involve (cf. Jefferson, 1985b). The response in line 8 does not, however, take an affective stance to the report of life changes. ‘Ai jaa’/‘Oh I see’ is a conventional response type in the (Finnish) language for responding to the prior talk as new information. It foregrounds the epistemic issues and can therefore be contrasted to ‘Iha totta’/‘Really’ (see lines 7 and 11 in Extract 1) which involve *both* the epistemic and the affective component. Neither does the prosody of Liisa’s response in line 8 convey affect or emotion. The pitch that starts from high and comes down at the second word ‘jaa’ conveys, I suggest, a readiness to hear more and may in this sense be empathic, but the utterance does not display its speaker’s own emotional reaction to the announcement. This neutrality is in line with the oblique character of Tuula’s initial announcement: she had not indicated whether the changes were good or bad.

In lines 9–10 Tuula proceeds into more detailed telling, partially in overlap with Liisa’s first response. It transpires that the life change involves Tuula and her family moving to Valtimo, a rural community some 50 kilometres from the town where they currently live and where Tuula is working. There are elements in the announcement which convey a degree of affect but the valence of which remains unclear. The announcement is done somewhat hesitantly – note in line 9 the perturbations prior to the word ‘moving’, and the prolongation of sound prior to ‘Valtimo’. Moreover, the beginning of the utterance is accompanied with laugh tokens (line 9), and at the key word of the announcement (‘Valtimo’), the pitch is lower than in Tuula’s prior talk. These elements give the announcement a somewhat embarrassed or delicate quality. However, there is no ‘embedded account’ (Heritage, 1984a) available for the delicacy. Moving is often understood as a happy event, and Tuula has not (yet) revealed reasons for the opposite.

In terms of emotion, Liisa’s response (line 11) also to this latter part of the announcement is neutral – but in a different way than her response to the first part. ‘Gosh:.’ (Finnish ‘Katos vaa:.’; line 11) treats the announcement clearly as *new information* for her. Her lexical choice is associated with positive rather than negative emotion: ‘Katos vaa’/‘Gosh’ would not normally be used at the receipt of bad news. However, there is a noticeable delay in the outset of the receipt and the pitch of Liisa’s talk remains on the same level as it was in her earlier utterances. These prosodic elements give the response a *reserved* quality, curtailling or shadowing the positive affect that could otherwise have been conveyed by ‘katos vaa’/‘gosh’. Liisa produces another, hardly audible response later in line 11, overlapping with the continuation of Tuula’s utterance. Judging from the hearable last word ‘even’, this utterance may have an evaluative character – but in any case, it is produced *sotto voce*, in a kind of soft manner. In

6The delay may also be related to Tuula’s inbreath in line 10.
principle, a stronger display of affect would have been possible after an announcement of a move which necessarily involves a major change of lifestyle.

Thus, in Extract 2, the reception of the announcement was emotionally neutral. Liisa’s choice to produce such response may be related to at least two things. First, the status of Tuula’s announcement as action remains subsidiary: it is presented in the context of the opening of a phone call, as an account for her not having contacted Liisa for some time, while the ‘reason for the call’ (Schegloff, 1986) has not yet been revealed by Tuula. Immediately after the announcement Tuula breathes in (line 10), thus indicating her intention to proceed into some new, not yet revealed action.7 A more affective response by Liisa might have proposed that the announcer elaborate the news (Maynard, 1997, 2003) – which is what happened in Extract 1. Thus, the recipient’s emotional neutrality in Extract 2 seems to be in line with the non-focal or subsidiary status of the announcement. The non-focal status of the announcement is also reflexively linked to the social relation of the participants (see Maynard, (2003)). By not giving the news about a life event as a focal action, Tuula treats Liisa as somebody with whom she is not in very intimate terms, and by withholding emotional response, Liisa aligns herself accordingly.

Secondly, the way in which Tuula describes her move may present the affective meaning of the announcement for the speaker as unclear or ambivalent. (In the first part of the announcement, she uses the term ‘changes in life’ which disguises the character of the change, and in the latter part of the announcement, there is hesitation, laugh tokens and a falling pitch when uttering the key place name.) The recipient’s choice of responsive action, which clearly conveys the newsworthiness of the announcement but is neutral in terms of affective valence is in line with this. In Extract 1 (where the recipient’s response was emotional) there was no such equivocality concerning the affective meaning of the announcement for its speaker.

The occurrence or non-occurrence of emotion display as such is something that a sensitive enough ‘coding and counting’ approach to interaction certainly could detect8 - the laborious CA analysis is not needed for that. What CA can offer, however, is to show the various and specific ways in which emotion displays are part of interactional business, shaped by it and contributing to it (see. Fridlund & Duchaine, 1996). The contrast between Extracts 1 and 2 demonstrates the fact that the display of emotion is embedded in the sequential organization of action. In Extract 1, the announcement sequence was built in a way that facilitated the recipient’s display of emotion, whereas in Extract 2, it was built so as to not facilitate that. These sequences do not reveal to us how the recipients, in their minds, related to the information conveyed by the news, but they show how they skilfully designed the display of their emotional reaction to be coordinated with the other party’s actions and the unfolding of the sequence they collaboratively are building. Something more complex, collaborative, and fine-grained is at stake in the display of emotion than the existence or non-existence of acts that can be categorized in ‘socio-emotional’ terms.

CA research on emotions

One task for future studies is to specify what kinds of particulars of speech – word selection, prosody, gesture, facial expression - constitute displays of emotion.

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7The actual reason for the call transpires in lines 12–16: Tuula requests Liisa’s service in purchasing goods from a special shop with low prices. The financial strains brought about by the move serve as justification for the plea.

8However, if Bales’ original coding scheme were to be applied, it would still remain debatable whether Jussi’s reaction in line 11 of Extract 1 should be coded in ‘task’ terms, as ‘asks for orientation (information, repetition, confirmation)’ (item 7 in Balesian scheme), or in socio-emotional terms, as ‘shows tension’ (item 11) in the Balesian system).
Moreover, are there empirical grounds on which we can differentiate the interactional displays of different emotions, such as joy, sorrow, astonishment etc.? While these questions have been examined in many disciplines (see e.g. Scherer, Ladd, & Silverman 1984; the recent collections from Harré & Parrott, 1996; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998), the more specific CA questions involve the organization of these displays and their intersections with other layers of organization in conversation. In CA, the displays of affect are examined as parts of sequentially organized practices (such as the delivery and reception of announcements as above). The technical specification of these practices is a pre-requisite of the adequate analysis of the affect displays involved in them (see Schegloff, 1997). On the most general level, actions are organized in terms of first and second position acts (Schegloff, 1995). We may then ask: what are the features in specific first position acts (such as an announcement) that make relevant affective responses? What kind of relevancies do affective responses create for the unfolding of sequences after the second position, as compared with non-affective responses? What kind of interactional trajectories follow if a second position act, after an ‘emotionally relevant’ first position act, is not affective (cf. Sorjonen, 1999, 2001)? In what ways can recipients recast the prior talk by the co-participant as having contained affective dimensions even though it might not, on the surface, contain these? Answering questions like these entails that the line of analysis currently performed by discursive psychologists (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Edwards & Potter 1992), focusing on the use of emotion terms, will be expanded to encompass other sorts of lexical and non-lexical displays of emotion.

This line of research was, in fact, suggested by Sacks (1992b, pp. 572–574) in his very last lecture: ‘...we won’t find that strong sorrow and strong joy are just distributed over the course of the conversation but instead, there are real places for them to occur’ (p. 572, italics added). On a general level, the CA perspective on affect and emotion has involved the empirical specification of these places. Furthermore, as Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) recently suggested, the sequential analysis of emotional expressions should also be linked with an analysis of the broader activity context of emotional talk. Different institutional contexts require, and get realized through, different ways of displaying, responding to and managing emotion.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have retrospectively compared the Balesian and the Sacksian tradition of interaction research and, to illustrate that comparison, I outlined the CA approach to research on emotions. Even though Bales’ IPA is these days mainly of historical interest, its influence is evident in social psychological interaction research which categorizes behaviour and counts it. It has been worth while, then, to bring the old (Bales) and the new (CA) in interaction research into dialogue.

In the first part of the paper, I pointed out that despite the lack of mutual contact between the two traditions, and the diametrically opposed stances they take on many fundamental issues, there is considerable overlap in their concerns. The Sacksian tradition (and more specifically, CA) has considerably expanded our understanding of the issues that the Balesian tradition was originally designed to examine, re-specifying the questions and phenomena of interaction research. The choice of method always arises from what the researcher wants to know. Neither the Sacksian nor the Balesian tradition provides ways of answering all questions pertaining to social interaction. The first part of the paper argued, however, that there is a field of primordial interactional
phenomena that CA, rather than Balesian or other ‘coding and counting’ approaches can deal with. In the final part of the paper, I outlined an area of research – emotion in interaction – to demonstrate the detailed way that CA deals with phenomena of a particular interest for social psychology.

In the CA view, expression of emotion is not a distinct act to be categorized or otherwise treated separately. Thus, instead of examining distinct acts within the ‘socio-emotional area’ (as the Balesian researchers would do), CA researchers can explore the ways in which the display of emotion is incorporated in other actions, such as delivery and reception of announcements, and the ways in which the emotional components of these actions contribute to the different trajectories of interaction that these actions can engender. Here, as in other areas of research, CA is concerned with the actual methods that the participants use in producing, recognizing and responding to particular actions.

By comparing and contrasting the two traditions of interaction research, I hope to have explored the specific character of the contribution that the Sacksian tradition has made and can continue to make to social psychological research. By discussing CA in Bales’ terms, I have tried to formulate CA methodology and some of the CA findings in ways that show their relevance for both general and applied social psychology.

**Acknowledgements**

Some of the ideas of this paper were initially outlined in my inaugural lecture as Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Tampere, Finland. The lecture was published in Finnish in *Sosiologia* in 1999. I thank Erik Allardt, Charles Antaki, Derek Edwards, Antti Eskola, Vilma Hänninen, John Heritage, Doug Maynard, Johanna Ruusuvuori, David Silverman, Marja-Leena Sorjonen, Bill Stiles, and the anonymous referees of this Journal for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of the paper.

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Received 14 September 2000; revised version received 21 November 2002