Democracy in a Globalized World

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Introduction

Democracy has entered international theory primarily through what Kenneth Waltz (2001/1959) calls the second image of viewing the world, according to which peace and war among states can be best explained in terms of varieties of state rather than human nature or international system. In this image the “good” state is also peaceful.

A problem is that there is a variety of definitions of what internal structures constitute a good state. For liberals, societal harmony is possible only if private property and fair market competition are ensured by the state; for Marxians, private property is the reason for state violence. Both assume, however, that educated and well-informed people have no interest in war. It is mostly because specific interests prevail – those of monarchy and aristocracy, or owners of the capital – that there can be violence and war. Change the internal structure of the state and peace will prevail. Waltz himself was highly sceptical of this theory and thought the problem lies at the systemic level.

The plausibility of different IR theories and turns of world history are intimately connected. During the height of the Cold War the number of liberal-democratic countries was limited to some 30-40, but in the 1970s (in Southern Europe) and 1980s (in Latin America and then in Eastern Europe and elsewhere) this started to change rapidly. Samuel Huntington (1991a, b) introduced the term “waves of democratisation”. The idea is roughly that the first wave of democratisation began with the American and French revolutions and the extension of the right to vote in the 19th century. After the post-World War I upsurge and subsequent rapid reversal, the second major wave began with the triumph of the Allies in World War II. When the third wave of democratisation was already well on its way in the 1980s, *glasnost* and *perestroika* started to gain ground in the Soviet Union.

At the latest when the Cold War came to an end in 1989, and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the liberal version of the second image theory experienced a renaissance. Michael W. Doyle (1983a, b; 1986) became famous for remaking the argument that liberal democratic states are different. “They are indeed peaceful” (1986: 1151), though only in relations amongst themselves. Liberal states have been involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states; and liberalism may constitute a form of patriotism and crusading spirit against different others, generating violent conflicts. But if world history is moving towards a liberal democratic direction, and if wars among liberal states are highly unlikely, there is hope for perpetual peace.

The liberal version of the second image concerning the causes of peace and war is now known as the *theory* of democratic peace, even though its core is a mere empirical hypothesis, however robust it may appear in historical data. Doyle’s definition of a liberal democratic state was broad, including social democracy and democratic socialism, but repeatedly the understanding of democracy has been much narrower, if not ethnocentric along the lines of “the United States is the premier democratic country of the modern world” (Huntington 1991b: 29-30). Both the democratic peace hypothesis and various theoretical understandings supporting it have been key points of debate during the past two decades and into the 2010s.

There is much more to democracy in a globalized world, however, than the idea that it promotes bilateral state-to-state peace. During the world wars and in their immediate aftermath, the rule of law and democracy emerged as promising new principles for organising world politics as a whole. Many a world federalist – including Ronald Reagan in the 1940s – has sided with Waltz’s claim that it is the third, systemic image of the conditions of peace and war that really matters. Liberal democracies may be unlikely to fight each other, but without cosmopolitan law and democracy there can be no permanent peace. Moreover, if democracy is the enlightened and progressive way of organising power relations, should not the rule of law and democracy be applied to the world polity also in its entirety?

During the First World War, H.G.Wells coined the phrases “the war to end war” and “new world order”. Wells preached the idea that a postwar League of Nations should be given real powers and consist of delegates directly elected by the people of all the states represented (Wagar 2004: 160). That hope was soon frustrated, but re-emerged during the Second World War. When the United Nations was established, worldwide democracy was discussed widely and, to a degree and in a particular interstate form, also applied to the new world organisation. The General Assembly’s one country/one vote principle stands for democracy between states. Originally the Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC, was designed to be the core of the new system. Decisions of ECOSOC are made by a majority of the members present and voting.

The Cold War spelled a decades’ long pause to any further speculations about, and aspirations for, a democratic world order. Finally the topic of planetary democracy re-emerged in the 1980s with the rise of the globalisation discourse (Burnheim 1986), and with the end of the Cold War (Held 1991, developed further in Held 1995). The new-fangled vision is based on the claim that we already have multiple sites of power at various levels, sectors and aspects of social organisation. The task is to democratise them. The fairly novel angle of globalisation theory notwithstanding, the concept of cosmopolitan democracy shares many ways of thinking with older forms of world federalism. For instance, there should be a “permanent shift of growing proportion of nation-state’s coercive capability to regional and global institutions, with the ultimate aim of demilitarization and the transcendence of the war system” (Held 1995: 279).

In the early 2010s, despite the temporary peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, and despite the apparent long-term trend of declining violence and warfare, in real absolute terms world military expenditure is again at a historically high level. Should we explain this in terms of second or third image considerations? There is an alternative to both, however. Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957) introduced the notion of security community. They argued that a single state is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for peace, nor is the absence of a state above a necessary or a sufficient condition for political violence or a sense that there is a danger of violence. A security community is one in which there is a real assurance that *actors* will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes and conflicts in some peaceful way. Democracy provides means and procedures for non-violent political processes, but whether particular democratic institutions can ensure dependable expectations of peaceful changes is contingent. A less centralised and institutionalised pluralist security community is often easier to achieve and sustain.

In this chapter, I examine the state of the art in these three regards: the theory of democratic peace, the theory of cosmopolitan democracy and theories about the conditions of security community, the latter understood in terms of peaceful changes, self-transformative capacity of contexts, and democracy. In that connection, I re-open the (Rousseaun and) Marxian question whether private property in some sense can also be a reason for state violence, or political violence more generally.

The theory of democratic peace

According to the democratic peace hypothesis (DPH), liberal democracies do not fight each other (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993; Rummel 1995). A related but more general hypothesis – not reducible to DPH – states that the role of violence and war in human society has been declining for centuries if not for millennia (Elias 1978/1939; Gurr 1981; Pinker 2011; Muchembled 2012). As empirical claims these are susceptible to critical scrutiny and falsification. Does evidence support them?

The DPH seems an extraordinarily simple claim for social sciences: there appears to have been a nearly categorical absence of wars between liberal democratic states, with a few possible and marginal exceptions. Doyle relies on simple lists of wars and liberal democratic regimes, but later researchers have used more sophisticated techniques and nuanced data. DPH can also be extended to lesser conflicts than wars and examined in more detail and depth to see whether there are any underlying causes that could explain the correlation between democracy and mutual peacefulness (in other words, whether the DP correlation is spurious rather than genuine).

Following years of research and debate, the majority of researchers agree that the empirical connection holds, although we are talking about a fairly high probability rather than a sufficient (not to speak of necessary) condition for the absence of war. The most important exception to the empirical rule are the many cases of US interventions – or covert measures – against democratic and popular regimes in the global south, continuing, even if in a somewhat new form, the logic of the 19th century liberal imperialism (Rosato 2003: 590-1; Doyle 2005: 465). Critical discussions about the DPH have also revolved around other possible historical counterexamples, such as the 1941-44 state of war between Finland and Britain, which involved only one aerial attack, mostly fought by British and German forces.

Our theoretical categories and historical pre-understandings affect how we code the available data and interpret particular historical cases. Concepts not only have histories but are also involved in the construction of social realities. In the democratic peace theory, democracy must reside in the modern, sovereign territorial state and war is defined as a conflict of at least 1000 battle deaths between two or more states. Democracy is associated with multiparty elections, where each inhabitant of a given territory, entitled with citizenship, has one vote. Modern states capable of sustaining legitimate monopoly of violence and efficient administration within their territories, and liberal democracy, have developed hand in hand from the late 18th century onwards.[[1]](#footnote-1) Comparisons to earlier and other social systems may not be valid.

A simple correlation between territorial state-dyads is misleading also in another sense. For Immanuel Kant, republican constitution was only the first of three definitive “articles” for perpetual peace (in addition, Kant also outlined six preliminary articles in his philosophical sketch). Doyle (2005) talks about “*three* pillars of the liberal peace”: (i) multiparty democratic representation, (ii) commitment to fundamental human rights, and (iii) transnational interdependence. Together the three pillars are sufficient for peace, but none is enough in itself.

Whereas democracy is assumed to occur only within the territorial state, human rights and free trade are universalising principles, in effect connecting different parts of the “peace zone” also constitutively. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (1999) go beyond Doyle’s simple admission of this universality: states participating in the “peace zone” have evolved as part of globalising social processes that are not only co-constitutive of their internal meanings and structures but connect their development and powers effectively to other parts of the world economy and its governance. In these globalising process, state capabilities, including even coercive powers, may come be (re-)organised internationally, transnationally or supranationally.

From this perspective, globalising processes, democracy and the conditions for war and peace are interwoven in complex ways. While there may be no clear-cut underlying cause of both liberal democracy and peace, economic practices and the positioning of states in the changing worldwide division of labour condition possibilities for liberal democracy (see Mousseau 2003; Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal 2003; Lees 2013). These kinds of arguments do not need to be reductionist. They leave ample room for other reasons for and causes of democracy and democratic values. They can also be made compatible with the more general thesis about declining war. What they imply, however, is that democracy in a globalized world cannot be thought in isolationist or stationary terms. The world is an open dynamic process within which its active and responsive parts such as states are enfolded.

Since Kant, the idea of harmony of interests created by free commerce has been taken as a contributor to and even guarantee of peace. The assumption is that trade is always a win-win state of affairs, equally beneficial to everyone both in the short and long run (for a realist, Marx-inspired critique, see Carr 2008/1946). What Kant could not foresee is modern economic growth and its fluctuations. The world population and economy have grown rapidly since the mid- to late 19th century, and world trade even more so, but not smoothly or evenly. Many developments have been cumulative and self-reinforcing, generating not only unprecedented wealth particularly in certain regions but also wide disparities, frequent crises and occasional economic collapses.

Criticism of orthodox liberal economic theory premised on the efficient market hypothesis has implications to our understanding of global security (Patomäki 2008; 2011). Whether this criticism concerns unfavourable division of labour and exchange, business cycles generated by fluctuating aggregate demand, financial instability, or asymmetric power relations, the basic thrust is that economic growth and developments in production, exchange and finance can generate conflicts and cause problems. Actors and their audiences relate themselves to these problems, prompting not only political but at times also securitised or militarised responses. Furthermore, the lack of adequate collective institutions and governance may result in a spiral of downward developments, also through resulting de-democratisation, drawing mutually dependent actors into escalating conflicts. This process may, over time, lead even to war, even though according to DPH experiences of the past century indicate that war should be very unlikely as long as parties remain liberal democratic.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The theory of cosmopolitan democracy

Globalisation and systems of global governance limit the area of democratic decision-making within states. If this is seen as a problem, there are two logical possibilities. Either the scope and power of global flows and governance should be reduced, or democratised, or both. Some thinkers such as Dani Rodrik (2012) conclude that democracy can best be rescued by partial de-globalization and “smart” globalization. Cosmopolitan democrats opt for global democratisation. David Held’s (1995: 99) empirical argument for extending the reach of the principles of democracy beyond state governance is that “there are [many] disjunctures between the idea of the state as in principle capable of determining its own future, and the world economy, international organizations, regional and global institutions, international law and military alliances which operate to shape and constrain the options of individual nation-states”. Universal normative principles and the urgency of global problems such as climate change boost the cosmopolitan conclusion (Held 2010).

Moreover, it has been often argued that modern state’s functional responsibilities tend to expand while its capacities have eroded, or at least have not kept pace. Post-national cooperation and institutions can enhance their practical capabilities. Hence the quest to democratise global governance has been emerging as a key issue of world politics. However, this quest involves deep conceptual problems. What does democratic governance mean in worldwide contexts? How could we get from the current situation towards a more democratic system of global governance? How could we maintain and develop the would-be democratic system of governance? Indeed, who are ‘we’, where should ‘we’ be going and what should ‘we’ do to get there? Are there real transformative possibilities for global democratisation?

Perhaps the most articulate response to the quest to democratise global governance is the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, as developed by Held and his associates (Held 1991; 1995; Archibugi & Held 1995; Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998; McGrew 1997; Holden 1999; Marchetti 2009; Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi & Marchetti 2011). Cosmopolitan democracy ‘is a system of diverse and overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by democratic law’ (Held 1995: 234-5). The first step towards making this model real would be to develop the UN system to live up to its Charter and also beyond, by extending the mandate of the Charter. The main point would be to cultivate the rule of law and impartiality – thus challenging the current prevalence of double standards – in international affairs. (Held 1995: 269)

The short-term priority is to establish components of cosmopolitan democratic law, for instance by extending the reach of international courts and changing the constitutions of national and international assemblies. Held also envisages the widespread use of transnational referenda and the establishment of a global assembly (a world parliament), first alongside the UN system. Although only a “framework-setting institution”, the global assembly could become “an authorative centre for the examination of those pressing global problems which are at the heart of the very possibility of the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law”, such as health and disease, food supply and distribution, the debt problem and the instability of global financial markets (Held 1995: 274). Held’s plan also includes the strengthening of civil society and regional organisations as well as systematic democratisation of multiple transnational sites of power, including economic ones.

Is global democratisation in this sense desirable and possible? Some argue that democracy must remain national either because *demos* and nation are strongly connected or because of size-limitations. The *demos*-nation link can be represented as essential, as perhaps in some (metaphysical) versions of classical nationalism, but more frequently in contemporary scholarly discussions the link is depicted as contingent on what people do feel and think: “People belong to the same community of fate if they care about each other’s fate, and want to share each other’s fate” (Kymlicka 2001: 319-320). If it is an empirical fact that people tend to care only about their compatriots’ fate, arguably global democracy is not desirable at this point in geo-historical time. Today’s main issue concerns the just way of treating various minority groups within a single state. The time for cosmopolitanism may come later.

In classical republicanism small size was seen as a *conditio sine qua non* of democracy. The 18th century American anti-federalists were strongly opposed to a federation of 2-3 million people on the grounds that it would be too big for democracy. Robert Dahl’s (1999) contemporary scepticism about cosmopolitan democracy is based on the meaning of democracy (rather than *demos*) and allows for much bigger territory and population than classical republicanism. Dahl defines democracy as a system of popular control over governmental policies and decisions. A larger political unit may gain more control over the problem at hand, but citizens’ capacity to influence that government will be diminished; after certain point the system must lie below any reasonable threshold of democracy. The main reason for this trade-off is that most people in most contexts are uninterested in and uninformed about larger issues of world politics and economy; but it is equally true that each citizen’s vote count less, the bigger the political unit. National democracies are therefore likelier to work, though even in democratic states people usually do not care that much about foreign policy (unless it directly threatens their everyday life).

What or whom people care, and what they are interested in and may know, are contingent and context-specific, and thus susceptible to geo-historical changes. Theorists expressed views about these tend to be speculative rather than based on critical empirical or theoretical research. Furthermore, many claims lack consistency. Dahl suggests that while states such as the US and India may be democracies, the EU cannot be democratised. It is difficult to see any clear pattern of scale here among the three units. Moreover, the sceptics of global democracy do not address the consequences of globalisation for the autonomy and thus democratic potential of states, or the more specific dilemma outlined by Rodrik, according to which global markets, sovereign states and democracy cannot coexist. What is also important is that Dahl takes a centralised world federation as the only possibility and does not consider alternatives such as democratic polycentrism, according to which different actors and sites of power can be democratised in spite of absence of central government (see Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi & Marchetti 2012: 8-9 *et passim*).

The sceptics take the past and immediate present of world history as a decider of possibilities in the foreseeable (relevant) future, but the present consists of many open-ended processes that are happening. These processes may also be transformative and involve the internationalization of the state. Alexander Wendt (1999a: 128-9) makes a distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* sovereignty, arguing that globalization is likely to lead to *de facto* internationalization without much *de jure* internationalization, not to speak of transnational community-building. Group-sentiments prevail and people are reluctant to give up any part of their formal sovereignty. Under these circumstances, if a non-territorial democracy does evolve in the next few decades, it is much more likely to be “international” rather than “cosmopolitan” democracy. Whatever systems of common governance may exist in the reasonably nearby future will usually gain functionalist legitimacy by promoting peace, growth, welfare etc. People and movements will rise to demand global democracy only in response to really robust and possibly repressive transnational centres of power, once they have evolved. This scenario of change does not, however, play any major role in Wendt’s (2003) argument about the inevitability of world state. States partaking in the long transformative process do not have to be democratic, even though “democratic deficit” could undermine the future world state.

Wendt’s view on global democracy stems more from his onto-theoretical contentions (as outlined in Wendt 1999b) than from any empirical research on concrete geo-historical processes or involvement in ethico-political debates within those processes. If “states really are people too” (ibid.: 215), and if world history progresses through cultures of anarchy among state-persons, from Hobbesian through Lockean and Kantian, towards a world state, the best we can imagine in the next few decades years is some “international” democracy within the Kantian culture of anarchy, which we may be currently approaching. Domestic liberal democracy may contribute to the process of building trust, which can erode egoistic boundaries of the Self and expand them to include the Other, steering developments towards a collective identity (ibid.: 357-66). By externalizing democratic ways of doing politics – peaceful conflict resolution, readiness to dialogue and compromises, rule of law etc – in their foreign policy behaviour, state-persons build the conditions for mutual trust, seeing others as self-limiting too. Eventually, as the process continues, their identities may merge.

There is a tension between the views (i) that domestic liberal democracy can be conducive to trust and collective identity formation among states, (ii) that foreign policy tends to be undemocratic, in part also because citizens do not know or care about the issues at stake, and (iii) that power-relations in liberal capitalist world economy constrain democratic autonomy and, furthermore, that economic processes can in various ways undermine *de facto* and even *de jure* democracy at home. A possible solution to this problematic could be worldwide democratic polycentrism, especially if realisable within the time-span of a few decades. Held’s (1995: 234–5) model of cosmopolitan democracy “is a system of diverse and overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by democratic law”, not a centralised world state.

What is therefore needed, it seems, is a realistic and feasible strategy of global

polycentric democratization. Held and his associates are concerned with detailed prescriptions about how global governance should be organized but have only little to say about who could (or would like to) realize his vision, under what circumstances, and with what consequences (Patomäki 2003: 357-8 *et.passim*; see also Patomäki & Teivainen 2004). What thus emerges, instead of a simple *model* of cosmopolitan democracy, is a vision of an open-ended process of global democratization produced causally by concrete – embodied and relational – actors, who will also have to address the problem of violence in their own categories and being, and who can form various (also new) forms of political agency (Patomäki 2011a; see also the discussion about the underlying principles and violence in Held & Patomäki 2006). Global democratization would have to be grounded on realist analysis of the relevant context, its concrete embodied actors, its social relations and mechanisms, and its real transformative possibilities. This implies, among other things, a scheme of producing emancipatory knowledge about social worlds. Without appropriate understanding of a particular context and explanation of the relevant outcomes in a critical way it is impossible to know whether any change is needed and if so, what kind of change.

It is often much easier to create new international law and new systems of global governance than to democratise the existing ones. Any grouping of countries can establish a treaty, which is open for all states to join, and thereby create new international law. Thus things like the establishment of a debt arbitration mechanism and global taxes – such as the currency transactions tax and global greenhouse gas tax – emerge as the most prominent possibilities also for global democratisation. Especially financial reforms can be seen as a priority in the strategy for global democratization. By tackling important aspects of the power of finance and by creating democratic forums and new public sources of finance, the world political context can change and become more favourable to further transformations. Most importantly, by relieving the effects of debt and short term finance on the policies of states, the debt arbitration mechanism and participation in the emergent global tax regimes would make a number of states also more autonomous in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) negotiations. As part of this vision, also the notion of world parliament can be developed further in order to make it more relevant (Patomäki 2007). In world politics interpretations of what the law is are often highly divergent, also for structural reasons. There is a need for a democratic body that can legitimately settle conflicts of interpretation and determine what the law actually is. This global assembly proposal involves giving real powers to the world parliament but avoids the problems and dangers of traditional federalism. A world parliament, thus designed, would constitute a world system based on law – a leap from international law towards properly cosmopolitan and democratic law, enabling new future possibilities.

Pluralist security community and polycentric world democracy

It is widely acknowledged that liberalism may constitute a form of patriotism and crusading spirit against different others, generating violent conflicts. Liberalism can be seen as an internal code, or grammar, that frames the identification of social and political problems and constitutes a particular mode of responsiveness to them. Variations of liberalism may differ in their peace-proneness. Thus John MacMillan (2004) argues that Left versions of liberalism – including social democratic and socialist strands – tend to be more peaceful and less crusading than Right liberalism. This is because the former are more critically reflective upon the force of their own contentions. Parliamentary institutions and public opinion are important too, particularly in contexts where the opposition parties and large parts of the population share the aversion to war and violence, either because of ethico-political considerations or by being directly affected, emotionally or personally, by the consequences of war. No structures have effects without agency.

In security communities actors are not prepared to the use of violence against others. I have elsewhere argued that the key to understanding and explaining the possibility of security communities lies in the self-transformative capacity of contexts, generating dependable expectations of peaceful changes and integration (Patomäki, 2002: 200-2). Social and political contexts differ in their openness to change, and this is crucial for the emergence and maintenance of a security community. The self-transformative capacity of contexts has epistemic implications – it is not compatible with illusions and mystifications about, or reifications and naturalizations of social realities. Conversely, the denaturalization and critical reflexivisation of understandings can contribute to the openness and responsiveness of the community.

It is at this level that the Marxian argument, according to which private property is a key reason for state violence, remains plausible. Particular politico-economic interests and their force are grounded on deeper considerations about the inviolability of private property and about the extension of related rights. In a world-historical context dominated by neoliberalism, this may go mostly unnoticed for a period of time as a taken for granted feature of the background context of interactions, because in the neoliberal model private property rights are fundamental and primary. They define the essence of freedom and the rule of law. Any deviation from the rule of law would violate natural law or sacred social conventions. Government should do nothing without the consent of property-owners/citizens. The basic thrust of this idea can be seen as democratic, but many forms of liberalism have been, and remain, ambivalent about the ultimate value of democracy and thus of non-violence. Attempts to anchor private property rights in Nature, Science or the Sacred also imply potential for anti-democratic and authoritarian practices. (Patomäki 2011b: 90-92).

The neoliberal program of transforming state and society into private markets, in the context of rapid internationalization of many aspects of state governance (Gill 2008 talks about “neoconstitutional locking-in of economic liberalism”), tends to reduce the sphere of autonomous national politics and democratic self-determination. Thus the processes of neoliberalization and liberal-democratization have been accompanied by a multi-faceted process of depoliticization (e.g. Teivainen 2002). For these reasons, it is arguable that within the overall megatrend of declining violence and war, the potential for violent and crusading responses has been growing.

Current developments are contradictory. In the theory of security communities (see also Adler & Barnett 1998), integration generates the non-preparedness for the use of political violence. Integration generates and helps to sustain a security community. Interdependence as such does not imply integration. Integration consists of sense of community – which can be understood and experienced in different ways – and expectation of peaceful changes. Although democratization and the development of security community are often mutually supportive, this is not always the case. Since the development of a security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalization of mutual acceptance, trust and procedures and practices of peaceful change, and since it is always vulnerable to escalation of conflicts, an unthinking attempt at global democratization may eventually be counterproductive. Moreover, any form of liberal democracy that includes the sanctity of private property, or fixes any other component of the normative belief system, may be inherently liable to violence when challenged by other ethico-political forces.

Thus when we are theorising democracy in a globalized world, we have to take into account existential constitution, the ways in which the past and/or outside is present in a given context. Beings and structures are relational and constructed out of manifold geo-historical components, including for instance deep geo-historical layers of liberalism. Furthermore, different processes can and do interlope and clash in various context. Co-inclusion of processes and tendencies in this sense is a general consequence of open systems. Within a wave of liberal democratisation there can be also contrary but contrary processes and tendencies. Moreover, past processes can have cumulative effects now and on-going processes can have cumulative effects in the future. Lagged, delayed efficacy means that processes take often long time to have effects. Also countertendencies can be multiple.

Parallel to and against the consequences of the worldwide process of neoliberalisation, a quest for polycentric world democracy has emerged (see Smith 2007). This quest is yet to materialise in major movements, but it is already visible both in the widening academic literature on global democracy and in the activities and demands of many global civil society organisations.

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1. European states only gradually developed the capacity to administer their territories; and such things as rules of diplomacy were codified only in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. The rise of the nation-state and “traditional sovereignty” is a 19th and especially 20th century phenomenon, and it has occurred simultaneously with various waves of globalisation. See e.g. Osiander 2001; Teschke 2009; Glanville 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Developments prior to World War I, leading to its outbreak, have routinely been interpreted in terms of the democratic peace theory, presupposing that the pre-war Britain, France and the US were democracies whereas Germany was not. This is complicated, however, as acknowledged in a footnote by Doyle (1983a: 216, n.8): “The Reichstag was not only elected by universal male suffrage but, by and large, the state ruled under the law, respecting the civic equality and rights of its citizens. Moreover, Chancellor Bismarck began the creation of a social welfare society that served as an inspiration for similar reforms in liberal regimes.” Moreover, the Chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag and was by and large needed to approve the budget (the Social Democrats infamously decided to vote for the special war loans on 4 August 1914). Doyle nonetheless defends the interpretation that Germany was an “autocracy” on the grounds that although Imperial Germany was comparatively republican and democratic in its domestic politics, this republicanism did not extend to its foreign policy. This distinction raises the question of how many countries have followed the principles of democratic republicanism – including the principle of openness and publicity – in their foreign policy? [↑](#footnote-ref-2)