Upadated July 8, 2016
Organised by Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, Marko Lindroos, Gordon Munro and Pedro Pintassilgo
Description:
Fisheries involve multiple actors: fishermen, managers, nations, NGOs - the list is long. Game theory has been for a few decades the main tool to address issues related to the strategic interaction among these groups, called players in the game theory language. Thus far most of the contributions have concentrated on international issues, e.g. United Nations agreements like Law of the Sea and to the analysis of Regional Fisheries Managements Organizations. While there remains a wide set of unexplored international fisheries issues, it is the intention of the session to examine, not only international fisheries issues, but as well to examine the application of game theory to domestic fisheries management issues, and the inter-linkage between domestic and international fisheries strategic issues. There are already a few contributions in the area of game theory and domestic fisheries, primarily initiated with stage games, (Ruseski 1998) and expanding these stage games with coalitions (Kronbak and Lindroos, 2006). However, many more studies are needed as shown in a recent Marine Policy article by Wallace, Munro et al. Also in the EAERE 2015 conference in Helsinki several papers in this theme were presented applying principal agent type of game and contract modeling taking into account the important role of incomplete information in fisheries management. The purpose of the session is to invite key international scholars to present their latest results and modeling ideas on the topic and discuss future avenues for research on the theme, which is not only academically interesting but also extremely relevant for practical fisheries policy. Note also a recent review article, by Pintassilgo, Kronbak and Lindroos (2015).
We aim at making the sessions interactive by using online response systems for catching up ideas, examples and avenues for future research. 
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Session Papers
Session 1:
Introduction
Application of game theory to intra-EEZ fisheries management Gordon Munro, Marko Lindroos, Lone Grønbæk
The Number of Players in a Fisheries Game:Curse or Blessing? Rögnvaldur Hannesson
The political game of European fisheries management Margrethe Aanesen, Claire Armstrong
Discussion
Session 2:
International Fisheries Agreements and Non-consumptive Values Pedro Pintassilgo, Marita Laukkanen, Lone Grønbæk, Marko Lindroos
The new entrant problem in transboundary migratory fisheries and the importance of sunk costs Maarten Punt
Multispecies Fishery Contracts with Asymmetry of Information Yulia Pavlova
End Discussion
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The presented session papers to be invited to a special issue of a journal
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Recent review papers on the topic
International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach
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Links