Evolutionary game theory

(Evolutiivinen peliteoria; EKOL3119, 1 ov)

 

Evolutionary game theory has become immensely successful in explaining adaptations when the fitness of any given individual depends not only on its own traits but also on what properties the other individuals of the population have (i.e., when selection is frequency dependent). Frequency dependence is most conspicuous in behavioural interactions (such as aggression or cooperation), where the outcome of an encounter obviously depends on both partners' actions. Indeed, evolutionary game theory first took off in behavioural ecology. However, many other realistic ecological interactions, including resource competition, predation, mutualism, heterogeneous habitats, and others, lead to frequency-dependent selection. The last decade has seen much progress in studying the evolutionary dynamics of ecologically significant traits.

The first part of this course will give an introduction to the now-classic part of evolutionary game theory based mainly on matrix games, with examples and empirical studies from behavioural ecology. Next, we discuss methods to study long-term evolution under general frequency dependence (adaptive dynamics). Special emphasis is put on ecological scenarios that favour diversification, leading to genetic polymorphisms and possibly to adaptive speciation. I assume no prior knowledge other than an introductory course to general ecology; no mathematical background is necessary (evolutionary game theory is in fact charming for its ability to explain intriguing phenomena with very simple tools).


Lectures: Tuesday 12-14 starting on 24 September 2002; in English
Place: Ecology seminar room

Contact: Eva Kisdi (Department of Mathematics, room 451)
Office hour: Tuesday 15-16 (but welcome any time), phone: 333 5686, e-mail address:
eva.kisdi@utu.fi 


This course is supported by the University of Turku through the Department of Ecology, and by the European Research Training Network ModLife through the Department of Mathematics, University of Turku.
 

 

Exam: 12 December (Thursday) 10 - 12 in the Ecology seminar room
Notes, books, etc. may be used (no sharing during the exam). You can repeat the exam once if not satisfied with the results.


1. The evolution of aggression: The Hawk-Dove game. Evolutionarily stable strategies in matrix games

2. Matrix games with more than two strategies. Lizards playing the Rock-Scissors-Paper game

3. The role of roles (asymmetric games: strength and ownership). Honesty of signals

4. The evolution of cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma. Reciprocity, spatial structure and kin selection. Cooperation in communities

5. The war of attrition and the size game (arms races)

6. Adaptive dynamics: Evolution of continuous traits under frequency dependence (general nonlinear games). Evolution towards fitness minima. Evolutionary branching and the evolution of diversity

7. Evolution of competitors

8. Coevolution in predator-prey systems

9. From disruptive selection to the origin of species (PDF, 835 KB)


Chapters 1-5

Recommended literature

J. Maynard Smith (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press
J. R. Krebs & N. B. Davies (1993) An introduction to behavioural ecology. Blackwell, Oxford
J. Hofbauer & K. Sigmund (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics. Cambridge University Press

 

References to individual papers

Sinervo B. & C.M. Lively (1996) The rock-paper-scissors game and the evolution of alternative male strategies. Nature 380:240-243
Johnstone R. A. (2001) Eavesdropping and animal conflict. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98:9177-9180

Brauchli K., T. Killingback & M. Doebeli (1999) Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. J. theor. Biol. 200:405-417
Nowak M. & K. Sigmund (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 364:56-58
Hauert C. & O. Stenull (2002) Simple adaptive strategy wins the Prisoner's Dilemma. J. theor. Biol. 218:261-272
Sigmund K. (1999) The social life of automata. Lectures on Mathematics in the Life Sciences 26:133-146
Leimar O. & P. Hammerstein (2001) Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 268:745-753
Milinski M. (1987) Tit for tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325:433-435

 

Files to download

General treatment of 2x2 matrix games (PDF, 83KB, 2 pages)

Bimatrix games (PDF, 69KB, 1 page)

 

Chapters 5-9

Recommended literature

Geritz, S. A. H., É. Kisdi, G. Meszéna, and J. A. J. Metz. 1998. Evolutionarily singular strategies and the adaptive growth and branching of the evolutionary tree. Evol. Ecol. 12:35-57.

Dieckmann U. & M. Doebeli. 1999. On the origin of species by sympatric speciation. Nature 400:354-357.

 

References to individual papers

Dieckmann U. & R. Law. 1996. The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes. J. Math. Biol. 34:579-612.
Kisdi, É. 1999. Evolutionary branching under asymmetric competition. J. theor. Biol. 197:149-162.
Kisdi É. & S. A. H. Geritz. 2001. Evolutionary disarmament in interspecific competition. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 268:2589-2594.
Doebeli M. & U. Dieckmann. 2000. Evolutionary branching and sympatric speciation caused by different types of ecological interactions. Am. Nat. 156:S77-S101.

A more complete bibliography

Lecture 9 (From disruptive selection to the origin of species) in PDF (835KB)